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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
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Case: CV-OC-2007-20193 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper
William Lightner, etal. vs. John Hardison, etal.

Date

Code

User

NCOC

CCWRIGRM

New Case Filed Other Claims

Ronald J. Wilper

MOAF

CCWRIGRM

Motion & Affidavit for Waiver of Fees

Ronald J. Wilper

MOAF

CCWRIGRM

Motion & Affidavit for Appointment of Counsel

Ronald J. Wilper

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Denying Motion for Counsel, Fee Waiver,
Prelim. Injunction

Ronald J. Wilper

COMP

CCDWONCP

Complaint Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

SMF l

CCDWONCP

(7) Summons Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

AFOS

CCDWONCP

Affidavit Of Service (01/15/08)

Ronald J. Wilper

CERM

MCBIEHKJ

Certificate Of Mailing

Ronald J. Wilper

ANSW

CCTEELAL

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCTEELAL

Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (Kubinski for
Hardison Blades Kirkman Mclntire Amerfoot
Greenland)
Motion to Dismiss Certain Named Defendants

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCTEELAL

Motion to Amend Civil Rights Complaint

Ronald J. Wilper

SMF l

CCTEELAL

Summons Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCMCLlLl

Affidavit in Support of Amended Complaint

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Amended Affidavit in Support of Amended
Complaint
Notice of Status Conference

HRSC

DCJOHNSI

AFFD

CCBARCCR

NOTC

CCEARLJD

Notice of Change of Address (William Lightner)

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCTOONAL

Motion to Show Cause

Ronald J. Wilper

MlSC

MCBIEHKJ

Non Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Certain
Defendants

Ronald J. Wilper

RESP

CCTOWNRD

Response To Motion to Amend Civil Rights
Complaint

Ronald J. Wilper

RESP

MCBIEHKJ

Response To Motion to Show Cause

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion with Affidavit and Support

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Notice Resetting Status Conf.

Ronald J. Wilper

CONT

DCJOHNSI

Continued (Status 06/12/2008 03:OO PM)

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Vacate Hearing

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCEARLJD

Motion to Transport

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCAMESLC

Motion to Dismiss Motion to Compel

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTS

MCBIEHKJ

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. W r b

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order Granting Motion to Amend Complaint

Ronald J. WI

Judge

-

Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/29/2008 03:OO
PM)
Affidavit of Pamela Herold RE: Service of
Complaint

Ronald J. Wilper
Ronald J. Wilper
Ronald J. Wilper

/*O%&

&&Y*
$$<$Q

Date: 51282009

-

*#-**<
@$jg
="k
7"(

&@rth Judicial District Coutt Ada C o u n q d

Time: 08:51 AM

User: CCLUNDMJ

ROA Report

Page 2 of 4

Case: CV-OC-2007-20193 Cunent Judge: Ronald J, Wilper
William Lightner, etal, vs. John Hardison, etal.

Date

Code

User

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

AMCO

Judge

CCEARLJD

Hearing result for Status held on 0611212008
O3:OO PM: District Court Hearing Held
Caurt Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:
Amended Complaint Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

SMFl

CCEARLJD

(3) Summons Filed

Ronald J. Wilper

AFOS

CCTEEUL

Affidavit Of Service of Richard Drennon 6.17.083

Ronald J. Wilper

ANSW

CCCHILER

HRSC

DCABBOSM

HRSC

DCABBOSM

Answer Eo Amended Complaint and Jury
Ronald J. Wilper
Demand (M Kubinski for Hardison, Nelson, &
Reinke)
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/18/2009 09:OO Ronald J. Wilper
AM)
Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference
Ronald J. Wilper
0 2 1012009 03:30 PM)

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Order Setting Proceedings and Trial

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

MCBlEHKJ

Ronald J. Wilper

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Motion to Dlsqualify Judges Becker, Goff,
Hurlbutt, Judd, Meehl, Shilling, Woodland and
Trout
Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Various
Judges, Without Prejudice

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Renewed Motion to Disqualify Judge Daniel
Hurlbutt

Ronald J. Wilper

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Denying Motion

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTS

CCWATSCL

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

CCGDULKA

NOHG

CCRANDJD

MOTN

CCRANDJD

Motion for More Definite Answers and Affidavit in Ronald J. Wilper
support
Notice Of Hearing re Motion for More Definite
Ronald J. Wilper
Answer (11.6.08@3:30pm)
Ronald J. Wilper
Motion to Transport

MlSC

CCMCLlLl

MlSC

CCMCLlLl

AFFD

Ronald J. Wilper

Ronald J. Wilper

Ronald J. Wilper

CCMCLlLl

Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to
Transport
Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for
More Definite Answer
Affidavit of Mark A. Kubinski

NOTS

CCMCLlLl

Notice Of Service

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Notice Vacating Hearing

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

CCDWONCP

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

Amended Notice of Hearing (Hearing Scheduled Ronald J. Wilper
11/14/2008 11:00 AM)
Ronald J. Wilper
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
11/14/2008 11:OO AM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reoorter: cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:50

Ronald J. Wilper
Ronald J. Wilper
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Case: CV-OC-2007-20193 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper
William Lightner, etal. vs. John Hardison, etal.

Date

Code

User
-

11/21/2008

-

Judge

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Denying Motion for More Def. Statement

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion for Summary Judgment

Ronald J. Wilper

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of MSJ

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of John Hardison

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Mark A Kubinski

Ronaid J. Wilper

AFFD

MCBIEHKJ

Affidavit of Jill WhiMngton

Ronald J. Wilper

HRSC

MCBIEHKJ

Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion for
Summary Judgment 12/29/2008 11:00 AM)

Ronald J. Wilper

MOTN

MCBIEHKJ

Motion to Amend Order Setting Proceedings and Ronald J. Wilper
Trial

11/25/2008

ORDR

DCABBOSM

Ronald J. Wilper

11/26/2008

NOTH

CCNELSRF

Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Amend
Order Setting Proceedings and Trial
Amended Notice Of Hearing

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 12/22/2008 02:OO PM) Amended

Ronald J. Wilper

RSPN

CCBOYlDR

Response and Objection to States' Motion for
Summary Judgment with Affidavit in Support

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCBOYlDR

(2) Affidavit

Ronald J. Wilper

12/1512008

REPL

CCGWALAC

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment

Ronald J, Wilper

1211612008

MOTN

CCWRIGRM

Motion to Strike Affidavit of William Lightner

Ronald J. Wilper

12117/2008

AFFD

CCNELSRF

Affidavit of Mark Kubinski In Support of
Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of William
Lightner

Ronald J. Wilper

1211912008

NOTC

CCDWONCP

12/22/2008

DCHH

DCJOHNSI

1/29/2009

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

CDlS

DCJOHNSI

STAT

DCJOHNSI

Notice of Filing Affidavit in Support of Response Ronald J. Wilper
to Defendants' Motion to Strike William Lightner's
Affidavit
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Ronald J, Wilper
held on 12/22/2008 02:OO PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: cromwell
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Amended-50
Ronald J. Wilper
Order Granting Def. Motion for Summary
Judgment
Ronald J. Wilper
Civil Disposition entered for: Amersfoort, Tony,
Defendant; Blades, Randy, Defendant;
Greenland, Co, Defendant; Hardison, John,
Defendant; Kirkman, Jeff, Defendant; Mcintire,
Trent, Defendant; Nelson, Steve, Defendant;
Reinke, Brent, Defendant; Lightner, Marcia,
Plaintiff; Lightner, William, Plaintiff. Filing date:
1/29/2009
Ronald J.
STATUS CHANGED: Closed

12/9/2008

Ronaid J. Wilper
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Case: CV-OC-2007-20193 Current Judge: Ronald J. Wilper
William Lightner, etal. vs. John Hardison, etal.

Date

Code

User

2/9/2009

Judge
Miscellaneous Payment: Transcript Of Recording Ronald J. Wilper
Per Page Paid by: Lightner Receipt number:
0016481 Bat&: 21912009 Amount: $15.00
(Credtt card)
Motion To Reconsider The Courts Order
Ronald J. Wilper
Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment

MORE

CCFERCJD

MEMO

CCFERCJD

Memorandum in Support of Motion For
Reconsideration

AFFD

CCFERCJD

REPL

CCGWALAC

APSC

CCTHIEBJ

Affidavit of Marcia Lightener in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper
For Reconsideration
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Ronald J. Wilper
Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment
Appealed To The Supreme Court
Ronald J. Wilper

MOAF

CCTHIEW

Motion & Affidavit For Fee Waiver on Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Denying Motion to Reconsider

Ronald J. Wilper

NOTC

DCJOHNSI

Notice of Intent to Deny Motion

Ronald J. Wilper

AMEN

CCTHIEBJ

Amended Notice of Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

RSPN

CCTHIEBJ

Response to Plaintiffs' Motion And Affidavit for
Fee Waiver on Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCTHIEBJ

Aftidavit of Mark A. Kubinski

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCGARDAL

Ronald J. Wilper

AFFD

CCGARDAL

Affidavit of Marcia Lightner for Fee Waiver on
Appeal
Affidavit of William Lightner for Fee Waiver on
Appeal

ORDR

DCJOHNSI

Order Recommending Denial of Fee Waiver on
Appeal

Ronald J. Wilper

Ronald J. Wilper
Ronald J. Wilper

William 1,ightner
ISCl#41438
PO Box 14
Roisc [I), 83714
Plaintiffs,
Marcia I,ightner
300 I1 41't Street
Garden City, Id, 83714
Plaintiffs,
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

William Lightner
Marcia Lightner
Plaintiffs,

Case No.

1
1
1

VS

John Hardison, Randy Blades,
Steve Nelson, Jeff Kirkman,
Trent McIntire, Tony Amersfoort,
CO. Greenland, John Doe's st., al.
Defendants,

42 U.S.C. 1983
CIVIL RIGHT COMPLAINT

1
1
1
)
)

PARTIES

1.

William Lightner is a citizen of Idaho, presently residing at ISCI P. 0. Box 14
Boise, ID. 83707.

2.

Marcia Lighlner is a citizen of Idaho presently residing at 300 E 41SiStreet Garden
City, ID. 83714.

42 U.S.C. 19f23Civik

Cmp1aint -1-

Defendant's

3.

John Ilardison is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISGI P.O. Box 14
Boise ID. 83707. At the time the claim alleged in this complimt arose, the
defendant was acting under the color of the State law. In the capacity of ISCI
Warden. He is ultimately responsible for the events and actions of staff at ISCI.

4.

Randy Blades, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC' 1299 N. Orchard Ste #
I10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time the claim alleged in this compliant arose, the
defendant was acting under the color of the State law, in the former capacity of 1SCl
warden.

5.

Steve Nelson is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC 1299 N. Orchard
Ste # I 10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time of the claim alleged in this complairzt
arose, the Defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of
the ISCI Deputy Warden of Operations.

6.

Jeff Kirkrnan is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCZ P.O. Box 14 Boise Id.
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the Defendant
was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI wardens
assistant, and was involved with the reinstatement of visiting through and by exwarden Blades.

7.

Trent McIntire, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI, P.O. Box 14 Boise, ID
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the Defendant
was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI visiting
room Sgt.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -2-

8,

CO 'I'ony Anrershorl, is a citizen of fdr-tho, who's address is ISGI
P.O. Box 14 Boise, IT). 83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint
arose, the defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the
lSG1 visiting room conectional officer.

9.

CO GreenIand, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI P.O. Box 14 Boise, ID.
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the defendant was
acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI visiting room
correctional officer.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to IG 1-705 and 1C 18-310 ( 1).

NATURE OF THE CASE
10.

William and Marcia Lightner have been legally married for 11 years.

I 1.

Marcia Lightner was arrested by information on or about 10 April 2007 and
released by the Court on bail.

12.

On or about 12 April 2007 Marcia Lightner was informed by Steve Nelson
that do to her recent arrest her visiting privileges were indefinitely suspended.

13.

'This suspension continued for 10 weeks, while Randy Blades was ISGI
warden. After appealing the issue to Warden Blades by writing him a letter of
explanation about the arrest and unjust actions taken against their visiting, Warden
Blades reinstated the Lightner's visiting. He had his assistant, Jeff Kirkman contact
Marcia Lightner informing her that she was again approved by the warden to visit.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -3-

14.

As of 1 October 2007 without f u ~ h c incident
r
or conflict, new, cument bvarden
Wardisotl again suspended Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges with her husbarrd do
to her April 07 arrest.

CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 1
15.

' h e Plaintips allege that Section 13 of the Idaho Statc Constitution, md llSCA
Constitutional Amendment 14 was broke when Marcia received punishlent without
due process.

SUPPORTING FACTS
16.

"Thai tuking awuy ofprivilegs is u fbrm ofpunishment. In the It'nited Stares u
person is to he presumed innocent untilproven guilty. ' I n the Plaintiffs case. the
opposite has been found to be true. Marcia Lightner is being presumed guilty of a
crime prior to going to Court, and is receiving punishment by the Defendant's without
having been given a hearing. Even inmates receiving Disciplinary Offence Reports
(DOR's), in the penal system are entitled to a due process hearing. The Lightners are
being punished, by loosing the closest thing they have to a normal setting with each
other and that was to visit each seek. It has been said, and well known that to keep a
family union together, it is vitally important to share time together. It is also
necessary to have family support to functionally rehabilitate inmates. To deprive
William of his right to visit his wife is cruel and unusual when due process "A
Constitutional Right" is ignored.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -4-

17.

Hardison quotes policy 60.1 which is (NOT LAW), but which sttatcs:
"'r'erminution of Yisiting Ijrivileges Visitingprivileges may be terminated at the
dhcretion ~J'thejueiZibyhead or designee for any lensh oJ-lime,including

permanently, for violation or a~ter?yltedviolation ofuny state ortkderal Zuw, uny
hoar~irule, policy cmd procedure. SCIP, yield memorun&, orxailure lofollow stqf

i~~strucrions
(ervlphases au'dedf.
18.

"

1,ightners claim that their Due Process Rights ase being violated by receiving
a punishent prior to a conviction, or even a hearing. Due process is a guaranteed
Constitutional Right the Plaintips are entitled to. Lightners also claim that Policy
604 does not even mention a due process hearing. If this policy is to be interpreted
that due process is not necessary, then it violates the entire judicial system, and should
be deemed an illegal policy.

19.

It is clear that the Lightners had an established visiting schedule in which they visited
three times each week with out incident. To now initiate a visiting restriction on the
Lightners served no legitimate Pena logical objectives. In other words, there was no
legitimate governmental interest present to over ride the Lightners Constitutional
rights.

20.

Marcia Lightner had passed the adequate procedural safeguards prison
officials used when they granted her normal visiting privileges. Each year she
renewed her application and was approved. To take away those privileges from an
incident unrelated to the prison, in which had no baring on her visiting without due
process, is punishment and a USCA Constitutional Amendment 14 violation.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -5-

Lightner's claim that it~arcia" visiting p~vilegescould have been taken if she
bas found guilty by a Court of law. But to have her visits suspended without due
process of law is a violation of their Constitutional Rights.
Hardison's memo goes on to say "PentJing the outcome c!fherfekony charges shc

nzay reil;nplyfor vi.sititzg.

"

In essence, IIardison is openly and in w~iting,admitting

that he is fully aware that Lightner has not yet been accorded a due process hearing in
a Court of Law. We has taken it upon himself to be the Judge and executioner, to
place sentencing upon Lightner without holding the body of authority to do so.
Hardison's position (As he puts it ) is to use discretion as being the facility head, he
is not the judge, jury and executioner. His position requires him to review the facts
of security issues to the facility, and the Lightner's claim there are NO security issues
concerning their Visiting. When Marcia Lightner never posed a risk to the institution
prior to her arrest, or since her reinstatement fiom warden Blades. No special
circumstances exist that would warrant the disregard of due process.
To bar the Lightner's from visiting with each other, causes distress and mental
anguish from the separation. Violating their due process rights is not only cruel and
unjust punishment, it also inflicts injury to the survival of their marriage and has
caused depression and health issues that normally would not have otherwise arisen.
The suspension of their visitation was an a typical and significant hardship in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life. USGA Constitutional Amendment 14.
The Lightner's did not receive any written notification prior to the suspension, They
did not receive a hearing, nor were they afforded an appeal procedure. While Prison
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -6-

000012

inmates do not have a right to visiation, both visitors and inmates must be given the
right to administrative in judicial review of such restrictions.

CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM I1
26.

'fie Lightner's also claims that the ternination of their visiting privileges

is not just due to Warcia3 spending charge, but was aimed directly as a form of
hrassment and retaliation.

SUPPORTING FACTS
27.

'The Lightner's married in 1997. This was fiowned upon, because Marcia
Lightner had previously worked at Swanson's Commissary as a contract vender,
(Not a State Employee).

28.

Even after they were married, out of just pure meanness, the Lightners were denied
visiting privileges for 2 years.

29.

Marcia Lightner had to hire an attorney to assist them in getting their visiting
approved. After 5 months of legal intervention, the 1,ightners was given their
visiting privileges . Rut to continue the harassment, they were separated with a glass
partition for another year. It was then a total of 3 years and 5 months of no contact
and normal interaction before the Lightner's were given normal visiting privileges.

30.

Once normal visiting was approved, the warden, out of continued harassment and
retaliation transferred William to Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino (ICIO).

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -7-

3 1.

Mascia 1,ightner followed her husband to Oroilno, rented a home and staded
School in Lewiston. This did not deter the prisons atternpt to keep the Li&mers
sepmated. This time they moved Willim to a county jail at the other side of the State
in Idaho Falls ID. That act caused mother 1 I mon&s of sepzation before William
was eventually moved back to ICI0.

32.

For eleven (1 1) years, State prison officials have harassed m d aniempted to separate
the Lightner". This ha?;caused mental torment, anguish, and depression, not to
mention the cost involved.

33.

Marcia Lightner poses no securiv risk. It is simply harassment to now again suspend
her visits in the name of security, from an alleged incident that was not even at or
connected to the prison.

34.

The Lightners assert that their visitation was suspended for reasons other than
Marcia's pending charge. That being, retaliation against the Lightners because they
exercised their bdamental rights perfected by the Constitution to address other
issues they had in the courts.

35.

The 14&Amendment states in part "nor skull uny SIuk deprive uny penon dl*,

liberty, or proper@, with out due process o f h .

"

The Petitioners clairn that

Marcia's visitation in liberty interest was interfered with by ISCI officials with out
due Process, because it was being done in retaliation. Consequently, this imposes a
typical and significant hardship on the Lightner's Marriage in relation to the ordinasy
incidents of prison life.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -8-

CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 111
36.

Claim three (3) is also a violation of Idaho State Constitulion Article 13. It States

"No person shulI he iwier put in jeoprdyjbr the same u f i 2 ~ c e" The Lightners visits
were suspended for hur (3) months in April f i r Marcia's mest. To now suspend
them again for the same mest is Ilouble Jeopardy.

SUPPORTING FACTS
37.

The Ligbtner's were denied visiting from 12 April, 200'7 until 20 July, 2007 due to
Marcia's 10 April 2007 arrest.

38.

After having missed 41 visits. Marcia appealed the legality of the suspension to
Warden Randy Blades. Warden Blades, after concern and reconsideration, reinstated
their visiting privileges and Marcia was notified by telephone from Jeff Kirkman, that
she could resume her visiting with her husband.

39.

Upon replacing Randy Blades as warden, John Hardison again suspended Lightners
visits for the same April incident. Having lost visiting privileges once without due
process was bad enough but to now lose them a second time for the same offence is
Double Jeopardy.

PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
40.

'The Lightners have sought informal relief from the appropriate administrative
officials by talking personally, and on the phone to Prison officials when their visits
were Suspended.
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41.

As of the suspension idicted by Warden I-lasdison 1 October 2007 the
Plaintiffs have exhausted the prison &evance system m d making appeals
with the Corporate IDOC oEces. No relief was given.

42.

W e n all efforls t'ailed to get the visiting reinstated, The Lightners filed a tort claim at
the S e c r e w of Shte? s f i c e , and then this civil action.

CONCLUSION
43.

It is stated in reply that "Per visiting SOP 604.02.01.001" ISCI would not allow
Marcia Lightner visiting privileges. Just because the Defendants have a written
Sbndad Operation Procedure (SOP) or a policy in place, does not make it legal. To
deny someone visiting privileges because of an allegation is one thing, but to take that
established privilege away because of an allegation is punishent. Prison officials
themselves from allegations outside prison activity have tried, convicted and
sentenced Marcia 1,ightner by denying her visits.

44.

To invoke a punishment without due process simply as a policy and procedure is
Unconstitul-ional. It is slanderous, and creates mental and emotional torture. It has
been stated, that Idaho values marriages and family unity. Their Policies and
Procedures should show it. IDOG Policies and Procedures should coincide with the
Constitution and not violate the rights of a husband and wife from having a normal
setting of spending a valuable, and nourishing time together.

45.

Elected Governmental bodies have stated that Idaho promotes families, and family
unity. It should therefore be the States stand to promote and encourage family

42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -10-
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visivdtions. 'This recognition is based on the impoflance of visitation to inmates.
Visi~tionhas been widely recognized as indispensable to rehdbilitalion.
46.

With respect to having their visits suspended, thc Lightners were not given the
opportunity to be heard or present evidence because there was no hearing of any kind.
'They were not allowed to conti-ont accusers or cross examine witnesses. In fact, they
were not afforded any kind of procedure before being deprived they visiting
privileges,

47.

Under these circumstances, the rest of ewoneous deprivation unquestionably was
heightened. In the probable value of having employed at least some procedural safe
guards is considerable. It must be ruled that the Lightners should have been given due
process to ensure that the State-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.

48.

Suspending the Lightner's visits without due process is a Constitutional violation of
their rights. To do it twice for the same offence is willful malice with intent to harass
and inflict psychologically injury.

49.

The Lightner's due process rights have been violated. They were subjected to
harassment and Double Jeopardy, and are entitled to relief and compensation.

lZEQUEST FOR RELIEF
50.

The Lightner's request the following relief:

A.

'That while incarcerated, William Lightner #41438 will not be moved
from his current housing assignment. If he is again moved, it would have to be taken
as a serious form of retaliation do to the filing of this law suit. William Lightner is
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his cment housing assignment.

8.

?hat the Lightners receive noma1 visiting privileges, equal to, other visitors and that
to be denied visiting with out just eaxlse would bc considered a contempt of court.

C.

'I'l~ath r the Constitutio~alviolations, the Lighwers be awarded $100,000.00 plus
$5000.00 per visit that has been uneonstitutiomlly taken away from them.

D.

That lDOC be ordered to change their visiting Policy anci Procedures so that they
reflect Constitutional standards.

li.

Anything clse the Court feels the Lightners are due or entitled to.

F.

Finally, that these issues be heard and detemined by a jury.

Dated this

Dated this -

day o

day

008

08
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STATE OF IDAHO )

(ss
County of Ada

1

William Lightner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 'That he is a Plaintiff in
the above entitled action, that he has read the forgoing Complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and that the facts therein staled arc true as he verily believes.

SUBSCNDED AND SWORN to before me this 3/:,'day

of October, 2007.
I

Residing at
Gomrnission expires

.s- / @ - 2 0 , o

Marcia Lightner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That she is a Plaintiff in the
above entitled action, that she has read the forgoing Compl~nt,knows the contents
<'

thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true as she verily believes.

C
I
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of

C ) C ~ K ~2007.

AMY WOWON
NOTARY PUBLIC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I M R C I A LIGHTNER, DO IiEREBYSWUR UNDER PENALTYOFYUR/URY
THAT A TRUE AND CvORREC'TC f P Y O F THIS CIVIL RIGHTLY COhfPLAINT: AND
PRELIMINARY INJUM'TION U S BEEN M I Z E D TO DEFENDANTS BY GIERTIFIED
lJS MAIL.

WARDEN JOHN IlARDlSON et., al., INCLUDNG AND CN CARE OF: TRENT
MCINTIRE, TONY AMERSFOORT, JEFF K I K M A N , AND CO GREENLAND,
ISCI PO BOX 14 BOISE, ID 83707
RANDY BLADES, IDOC 1299 N. ORCHARD STE # 110 BOISE, ID 83706.
STEVE NELSON, IDOC 1299 N. ORCHARD STE # 110 BOISE, ID 83706.

Dated this

///
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s DAVID NAMRRO, Clerk
By A GARDEN

PAUL R. PAmmR,XSB #3X89
Lead Deputy, Corrections Section

DEPUTY

M

A.
NSm, ISB Jf5275
Deputy Attomey General
Idaho Depament of Colsectioa
1299 North Orchard, Suite 1I0
Boise, Iddhd 83706
Telephone (208) 658-2097
Facsimile: (208) 327-7485

Attolneys for Defendants

IN THE DXSTMCT COURT OF

FOURTR NDXCIAIL, DIS

OF THE STATE 0
1
F IDAXXO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

VVUILXAR"ILIGHTrnR,
MARCIA LICZlTTPER
Plaintiffs,

)

1

Case No, CV OC 0720193

1

1
)
)

A N S W R AND JURY D E m N I )

1

JOHN HAmXSON, W D U BLADES, )
STEVE NELSON, JEFB W, )
TRENT McmTIRE, TONY
)
AMERSFOOT, C/O GWEmA.ND,
1
Defendants.

1
1

Corn Now Defendants, by and though undersigned counsel and hereby answer
aid respond to Plaintiff's verified Civil Rigl~tsComplaint ("Complaint") on file in this

action. Defendants deny eaclz and every allegation in Plaintiffs' Complaint, unless

specifically and expressly admitted herein.

ANSWZR AND JURY D E W D - - 1
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1.

Auswelislg the allegations coabhed xn Parasap11 2, DeRndmts a & ~ t

only that Plaintiff William Lil&&ier 1s presently hcarcerated at ISGT.
2.

b w e r i n g the allegations conained in Paragapfi 2, Defendmlcs lack

sufficient howledge or infbx~~lat~on
necessary to f o m ~a belief as to the truth of the
maeers assmed, md &lrerc.eforepresently deny tlie same.
3.

Answering the allegations contained in P a ~ a g a p h3, Defendmts a&& that

Defenda~t:
FXardisol~is the Wuden at ISCI and to the extent he was acting w i t b the
course and scope of his employment, he was acting under color of state law. Defendants
fil-tI~eradmit that as Wa-den, Defet~datltI3ardison is the supervisor of ISCI s m ,
however, Defendmts deny any cllaracteriation or jl-uplication that by v h e o f h ~ s
position Defendant Hardison is vxca~iouslyliable fbr any alleged cotnduct of his staff.
4.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 4, Defendants admit that

Defendant Blades was previously the Warden at ISCX and to the extent be was acting
within the course and scope of 111s employment, he was acting under color of state law.
5.

Answering tlie alIegations contained in 1Pa;ragr-aph5, Defendants admit .that

Defendant Nelson was prevxously a Deputy Wardetz at ISCI and to the extent that he was
acting within the course and scope of his employnient, he was acting under color of state
law.

6.

Ausweriilg the allegations contained in Paragraph 6, Defendants adinit that

Defendat Kishatl was previously ail assistant to the Warden and to the extent that he
was acting within the c o m e and scope of his employment, he was actbig under color of
state law. Defendants further aQilit that Defendant Kirkman had some involvemex~t
regarding Plaintiffs' visitation issues.
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7

Answekg the al.llegr-ttio~~s
contamed in Parapaph 7, Defendants adxxlxt tlrar

Defendant Mclratirc is an DOC e~nployeeand to the extei~tthat be was actmg wichin the:
cou-se amid scope of his emplaymem, he was &clingunder color of state Ixw.

8.

Answer~ngthe allegatiolis coiitained in Paxagaph 8 , Defendants adznit that

Defendant h e m f o o t is an ID06 employee and to the extent that Ize was srcti~tgwithul
the course a i d scope of his employment, he was acting mder color of state law.
hsweriug the allegations c o u t ~ n e din Paxasaph 9, Defendan& a&iGt that

9.

Defei~dantGreenland is an U)OC employee md to Qe extent that he was a~tjslgwitbin
the course and scope of his employnent, he was actkg ~indercolor of state law.

10.

Answering the allegations contailled in the Paramph Igbeled

'

"Jurisdiction," Defendants adknit &e Court has jurisdictioli pursllartt to Idaho Code

1-

705; however, Defendants deny that Idaho Code 9 18-3IO(1) provides a basis for
jurisdiction.
Answering the allegations contained in P x a g a p h 10, Defendalzts lack

11.

sufficient knowledge or iilfomiation necessay to foim a belief as to the truth o f the
matters asserted, and therefore; presently deny the same.
12

Answering the allegations contained inParagrap11 I 1, Defendmts adinit

Plaintiff Marcia Li&b~erwas arrested on or about April 10,2007. Wtb respect to the
remaining allegations, however, Defendants lack sufEcient howledge or iiifoiaiation
necessary to forin a belief as to the truth o f the matters asset-ted, and therefore presently

deny the same.
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13.

Anstvehng the dilleg;2rions con&ed in Psagr:raph 12, Defcudants admit

os
only that on or about April 12,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Li&tner's v i s ~ t a ~privileges
were

suspended.

14.

Answehg the allegat.loris coxlained in Paragaph 13, Defendarzts admit

only that aIter approxin~atelythree months of suspension, plaintiff Marcia Liglltner's
Visitation privileges were reimtated.
15.
0 1 1 1 ~that

Answering the dlegations contained xn Paragraph 14, Defendmts admit

on or about October 1,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Light~ler'sv i s i t a ~ o nylrxvileges

were suspended. Defendants deny all r e m a ~ n gaIlega&onscontaixled in this parag~aph.

16,

Defendants deny the allegations eontauled in Paragraphs 15 and 16.

17.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 17.

18.

Defendmts deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 18, 19,20, and

19.

Answering tbe allegations contained in Paragraph 22, Defendants admit

the allegatiolls contained in the first sentence thereof. Defendants deny all remaining
allegatioils contained in this paragraph.

20.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 23 and 24.

2 1.

Answerii-rgthe allegatiorrs contained in Paragraph 25, Defendants admit

only that Plaintiffs were not given a hearing prior to suspension of Plaintiff Marcia
Li&mer3s visitation privileges. Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained iri
this paragraph, specifically including any characterization or implication that Plaintiffs
had a due process right in their visiting privileges.

22.

Defendants deny the allegntions contained in Paragraph 26.
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23.

hswering the allegations contained in Parapap11 27,lDcfen&1xts adnit

only that PlaintiE Mxcia Lightner previously worlced for ail IDOC collCract vendor.

With respect to the rernak~mgallegat~ons,however, Defelldants lack sufficient
howledge or hforl~ationnecessary to form a belief as to the truth o f f e matters
asserted, and therefore pi-esently deny the saxr.le.

24.

Defendants deny the allegations co~ztainedin Para@-aph28.

25.

Answering the allegations coutamed in Paragaph 29, Defenda~tsLack

sufficient knowledge ox infomxtion szecessary to form a belief as to the hxstil of the

matters asserted, arid therefore presently deny the sanle.
26.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragirlph 30.

27.

Answerilig the allegations contained in. Paragraph 3 1, wit11 respect to the

first sentence, Defendants lack suficient knowledge or iirfozxmtion necessary to form a
belief as to the truth of the matters assested, and therefore presently deny tlze sanze.
Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained in. tlnxs paragraplz.
28.

DelFendants deny the allegations colltained in P a r a ~ a p h s32,33,34, and

29.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 36.

30.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in Parngaph 37.

32.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 38, Defendants admit

35.

only that Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's visitatton privileges were temporarily reinstated.
Defendam deny all remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.
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32.

Answerhg the allegafions c o n t h e d in Parapapb 39, Dekxxdants a d n ~ t

the alfegabons contained in the first sentence thereof. Defendants deny all re~naining
allegations contailled in this paragaph.

33.

h s w e n n g the allegaliom coizkined ill Paragaph 40, Defc~~dauts
admit

that Plaintips had son= contact uri.th XDOC o E c ~ a l regarding
s
.their visitation privileges;
however, Defendants deny m y chazcterization or inwlication that Plax'xltiffs have

exhausted tlie administrative gt-ievarrce process.
34.

Defendants deny the allegations col~tainedin Pmp;raph 41.

35.

h s w e r i n g the allegations contained in Piu-agraph 42, Defe~x&ntsadmit

only that Plaintifcfsfiled a notice of tort: claim prior to filing this action.
36.

Defendants dleiiy the allegations colitained in Paxagaplls 43 and 44,

37.

Answering the allegations contamed m Paragraph 45, Defendants state

that such allegations consist of conclusory statemen& to which no response is required.
To the extent a response is deemed necessary, the allegaQons are denled.

38.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 46,47,48, and

39.

Defendants deny &e allegations contamed u7. Pwagraph 50, i~icluding

49.

subparagraphs A through F, thereof.

FIRST DEFENSE
Defendants have not been able to engage in sufficient discovety necessary to

learn all of the facts and circumstances relating to the matters described in Plaintiffs'
Complaint and theiefoore request the Court to permit Defendants to amend their Answer

and assert additrouai aEumat~vedefemes or nbaudon aKirxnative defenses once discovery
has been completed.

That PlainLiSfsa Coxl~plahtfails to state a cause of action against the Defendants
upon which rel~efcan be gai~tedand should therefore be disinissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Ldafio Rules of Civil Procedure.
r‘

DEFENSE

That the allegations contained in the Plaintigs' Coniplah~tdo not rise to the level
ofa deprivation of rights that are protected by the Coilstitution or my of the legal
provmslons refened to in the Plaiutiffs' Complaint.

FO'U3RTH DEFENSE
That Defendants acted in a reasonable and prudent fashion satisfying any duty, if
any, that they owed under the rules, 1-e~~lations,
statutes, ordinances, customs, policles

and usages the State of Idalzo and/or the United States of America.
FIFTH DEFEHSE
That Defendants are immune from, liability because the acts or orxissions
complained of, if any, were done by Defemidants in good faith, with honest, reasonable
belief that such actions were necessary and lawful at the t h e they occu~xed.

SIXTH DEFENSE
That Defcfetldants are immune, or have qualified iimnunity, to the allegatiolis
contained in the Plaintiffs' Complaint.
SEVENTH DEFENSE

All general im~~unities
statutory or otherwise applicable.

ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND-7
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PlaintzEfs have failed to exhaust the availdle admriisQ%tivcremecfies, and
otbelwise failed to compIy with available administrative remedies.

NXBTH DEFENSE
To the extent that the Plaix-tt~ffsare asserting state law claims, the lrab~l~ty,
rf any,

of Defendants fbr any state law c l a m or causes of action 1s lini~tedpursuant to the

pr,rovislons of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. In asserting this d e f ~ l ~ sDefenda~~ts
e,
are in no
way conceding or admitt~ngliability.

TENTH DEFENSE
To the extent that the PlaintlEs are asserting state law claims against Defendants,

some or all of such cla~xi~s
are barred since they arise out of andlor stem.frorn activities
for which Defendants axe i~mxunefrom liability by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho

Tor$ Clauns Act.
ETAEVENTHDEFENSE

That Defendants are not liable in litigation ptusuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983, for any

inju~y
caused by the act or omission o f another person under the theory of respondeat

stlperior.

D V E L m H DEFENSE
That the claims and damages set forth in the PlainriffsToiilplaint are barred by
the doctri~~e
of ui~cleanhands.
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To tbe extelnt that the Plaintifs are asserdag state: law claims against Defendants,
some or a11 of such claims are bmed by the failure of the PlalntBs to comply with the
Idaho Tort Claim Act.

That Pia~ntilTshave failed to con~plywith the bonding requirenzent set forth in
Idaho Code $ 6-61 0.

~ U X l l E11
Plaintiffs~laimsare brought frivolously and unreasonably and are not well
pounded h fact or law and Defendanh are elltitled to sanctions against Plaintiffs
pursuant to Rule 1 1 of the Idaho Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

m

y DEMkYD

Defendants, p m a n t to Rule 38@) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proceduxe, hereby
demands a trial by jury.

ATTORNEY FEES
Defendants have been required to retain attonneys in order to defend tllis action
and are entrtled to recover reasonable aMoriley fees pursuant to fedexal and state law and

the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

VV)-IEUFOU, Defendaxle pray for judgment against tlie Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That tlie Plaintiffs' Complaint be disnlissed with prejudice and that the

Plaintigs take nothing thereunder.

AfrlSWER AND JURY DEMAN1)--9
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P, Oil

2.

That the Defendant$ be awarded their cog&, h~cludingreasonable

attorneys' fees pursuant to state and fedeml. Xaw, iacIuding 42 U,S,C, $ 1988, Idaho Code

9s 6-918A, 12-11'7, 12-121, and "cheIdaho Rules of Civil Procedtire
3.

That judgment be mrered in favor of Beferrdnnts on at1 cltlirns for relief.

4.

For such other and hrtber relief as the Cour* deex~lrs~ u sand
t equitable

Respecthlly submitted this

y of F e b ~ u ~ r2008.
y,

STATE OF Dm0
OFFICE OF

DepuQ Attonley General,
Counsel for Defendants
CEKTLFICATE OF SERVXCE

I l3E?.EBY CERTIFY that on the

y oEFebmary, 2008, X caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoi~~g
ANSWR AND JURY DE
Williain Ligktner, # 41438
ISCT:
P.O. Box 14
Boise, X
D 83707
Via Prison Mail System

AND
Mal-cia Lighmer
300 E. 41'' Street
Garden City, ZD 837 14
Via U.S. Adail
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W ILLlAM 1,IC;I;fl'NER
ICC #f I 438 UNIT-(I'

PO Box 70010
BOISE, ID 83707
MAIZCIA LICH'I-NER
300 E 41" STmETT
GARDEN CITY, IT) 837 14
PLAINTIFFS PROSE

IN THE DISTI?RICPTCOURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WILLIAM LIGHTNER AND MARCLA LIGHWER )

Case No. CVOC07-20193

)

Plaintiffs,

1
)
)
)

-vs.-

JOHN NAmISON, BRENT E I N K E , and STEVE

NELSON
Defendants,

AMENDED
CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINT

1
)

1
1

1

COMES NOW, William Lightner and Marcia Lightner, Plaintiffs in the above
entitled action. pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure -15 (a). Plaintiffs are filing
this Amended Civil Rights Complaint on 16 June 2008, per the order signed by the
Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper on 12 June,2008.

FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

PARTIES
Plaintiffs
Willim Lightner is a citizn of Icjho, presently residing at ISCI P. 0. Box 14

1.

Boise, ID. 83707.
Marcia Eie;htner is a citizen of Idaho presently residing at 300 E 415"Street

2.

Gmden City, ID. 83714.
Defendmb
Brent Reinke, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC 1299 N. C)f;chardSte

3.

if1 10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the

defendant as acting under the color of the State law. In capacity as Direelor of the
1DOC
4.

John Hardison is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI P.O. Box 14
Boise ID. 83707. At the time the claim alleged in this compliant arose, the
defendant was acting under the color of the State law. In the capacity of ISCl
Warden. He is ultimately responsible for the events and actions of slaffat ISCI.
Steve Nelson is a citizen of ldaho, who's address is lDOC 1299 N. Orchard
Ste #I10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint
arose, the Defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of
the ISCI Deputy Warden of Operarions.
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JUMSDICTION
J ~ s d i c t i o nis a s s f i d p m s m t to IC-5-201 ETSEG; 42 USC 1983
N A W W OF THE CASE

Willim and Marcia Li&mer have been fegdly m&ed since 1997
(1 1 y w s ) and rht:

age license was approvd and n o w i d by IDOC persomel.

Marcia Li&mer was a e s t e d by infomAon on or about 10 April 2007 and
released by the Court on bail.
On or about 12 April 2007, While siping into visiting, Marcia Lightner was
informed by Steve Nelson that do to her r a n t m s t her visiting privileges were
suspended indefutitely.
13.

This suspsion continued for 10 weeks, while Randy Blades was ISCl
Warden. After appealing the issue to Warden Blades by writing him a letter of
explanation about the anest and unjust actions taken against their visiting, Warden
Blades reinstated the LiIr&tner%visiting. He had his assistant, Jeff K h a n contact

Marcia Lightmix i d o d n g her that she was again approved by the warden to visit
without any restrictions. There were NO visiting issues or complaints about the
Plaintiffs behavior during their visits after the reinstatement by Warden Blades.
As of I October 2007 without further incident or conflict, the new and current
Warden Hardison again suspended Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges with her
husband do to her April 07 arrest. Warden HaEdison contacted Marcia Lightner on
said day and informed her personally that her visiting was suspended do to the April
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7 arrest. Marcia Lightner told him that she had not been fbund guilty of any crime
and this action is a violation of her due process rights.
15.

hThenWarden Ifardison teminated the Plaintiffs visits 1 October 2008 prior
to anj conviction of a I'slony or misdemeanor, he deprived the PlaintilTs of the right to
Consortium upon this termination he executed, which is a violation of a Constitutional
Right to husband and wife.

16.

On or about 2 October 2007, Maria Lightner contacted the D O C headquaaers
for an Appointment with Director Reinke on the suspension of their visiting, and was
referred to the IDOC investigation depaament. After being denied an appointment
with the Director. Marcia Lightner mentioned of what took place to the investigator
and she was told that Urarden Hardison had the official say as to the situation and tiley
would not reverse the decision. The investigator commented that Marcia Lightner had
become a security risk. Marcia Lightner then replied that she had not been considered a
security risk by Warden Blades, and wanted to know what had happened fix them to
consider this risk now when it did not apply or seem to be an issue when Warden Blades
reinstated the visiting fbr the Plaintiffs. The response was that Warden Hardison had
the option per policy of the IDOC to terminate the visiting and that is what hu choose
to do. Marcia Lightner mentioned that she was not their inmate, and said, even
inmates get a due process hearing when allegations arise in DOR's. Marcia Lightner
mentioned that her due process rights were being violated do to not even having a
hearing prior to the suspension. Marcia Lightrier was then told that her rights didn't

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -3
FIRST &&MENDLiD

m a a r when it c m e to the scwri? of the institution. Macia Li&tner responded that
her righb DID MA-ER,

and their policy and procedure did not suwrsede her

Constitutional Due Process Rights.

17.

Marcia Li&tner &en contacted fomer Warden Rmdy Blades to seek assistance from
him as to what he might do to help the situation. Mr. Blades sent Marcia Lightner an
e-mail and mentioned to her that he would have to stand by the new warden's decision.

18.

From October to current date of 14 April 2008, the Lightners visiting srnd loss of
Gonsortim is still in violation of the C o m o n Law on their Constitutional Rights

19.

On or about 3 1 March 2008, Marcia Lightner plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of
resisting and obstructing with 2 years probation, one year supervised and one
unsupervised.

CAUSE OF ACTION CLMM I
15.

The PlaintifFs allege that Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, and
United States Constitutional Amendments, 5,6, 8, and 14 were broken when the

Plaintiffs received punishent without Due process and loss of Consortium, and caused cruel
and unusual punishment.

SlLJPPORTINGFACTS
16.

"Thai taking mvay ofprivileges is a form ofpunishment. In the United Staies u
Person is to be presumed innocent mti2proven guilw. In the Plaintiffs case, the
"

opposite has been found to be true. Marcia Lightner is being presumed guilty of a
crime prior to going to Court, and both plaintiEs are receiving punishment by the
Defendant's without having been given a hearing. Even inmates receiving
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Discipliw ORence Reports f DOR"), in the penal system are entitled to a due
process hearing. The Li&l~lersare being pwnished by way of loss of Consortium, by
loosing the closest thing they have to a nomal sening with each other and that was to
visit each week have contact as a married couple should have. It has been said, and
is a well b o w that to keep a family union together, it is vitally i m p m t to share

time together. Also to hctionaily rehabilitate h a t e s , it is necessary to have
family support. To deprive William of his right to visit his wife is cruel and unusual
when due proeess ""A Constitutiond Right" is ignored.
Hardison quotes policy 604 which is (NOT LAW), but which states:

"Terminofionof Yisiling Privileges, Visitingprivileges muy be terminated at the
dkcretion ofthe facility head or designeefor any length of time, including

Permanently, for violation or atfempted vMIation of'any st-aie ctr federal law, uny
board rule, policy und procedure. SOP, Jield memoranda, orfailure tofollow sta#
irrstructions (emphases aclde4. "
18.

Lightners claim that their Due Process Rights and loss of Consortium are
being violated by receiving a p ~ s h m e nprior
t
to a conviction, or even a hearing.

Due process is a guaranteed Constitutional Right the Plaintiff's are entitled to.
Lightners also claim that Policy 604 does not even mention a due process hearing. If
t h s policy is to be interpreted that due process is not necessary, then it violates the
entire judicial system, and should be deemed an itIegal policy.

FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -5

19.

It is clear that the Lightners had an esbhlished visiting schedule in which they visited
three times each week with out incident. To now initiate a visiting restriction on the
Lightners served no legitimate Pena logical objeclives. In other words, there was no
legitimate govemental interest present to over ride the Lil;thtners Constitutional
rights.
Marcia Lighber had passed the adeqwte prwedurd safeguads prison
oficials used when they granted her normal visiting privileges. Each year she
renewed her application and was approved. To take away those privileges from an
incident urnelated to the prison, in which had nu baring on her visiting without due
process, is punishent and a United States Constitutional Amendment 14 violation.
Lighmer's claim that Marcia's visiting privileges could have been taken if she
was fbusld guiIty by a Court of law. But to have her visits suspended without due
process of law and the loss of Consortim is a violation of their Constitutional Rights.

22.

Hardison's memo goes on to say "findingthe ourcome of'herfelany charges
she may reupplyfir visiting.

"

In essence, Wardison is openly and in writing,

admitting that he is fully aware that Lightner has not yet been accorded a due process
hearing in a Court of Law. He has taken it upon himself to be the Judge and
executioner, to place sentencing upon the Lightners without holding the body of
authority to do so.
Hardison's position (As he puts it) is to use discretion as being the facility
head, he is not the judge, jury and executioner. His position requires him to review
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the facts of secusity issues to the facility and the Li&tner7s claim there are NO
security issues concerning their Visiting. W e n Marcia Lightner never posed a risk
to the institution prior to her mest, or since her reinstatement from wmden Blades.
No special circumsmces exist that would

t the disregard of due process.

To bar the Lightner's from visiting with each other, causes distress and mental
mguish from the separalion. Violating their due process rights and deprives the

Lightners the right to Consortium is not only emel and unjust putisbent, it also
inflicts injury to the survival of their m&age and has caused depression and health
issues that normally would not have otherwise arisen. The suspension of their
visitation was an a typical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life. United Stated Constitutional Amendment 14.
25.

The Lightner's did not receive any written notification prior to the suspension.
They did not receive a hearing, nor were they afforded an appeal procedure. While
Prison inmates do not have a right to visitation, both visitors and inmates must be
given the right to administrative in judicial review of such restrictions.

CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 11
The Lightner's also claims that the ternination of their visiting privileges
is not just due to Mareia"~pending charge, but was aimed directly as a form of
harassment and retaliation by certain IDOC officers that has been on going for many
years. This conduct violated Marcia's rights to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
under United States Constitutiond Amendments, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth.
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -7
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SUPPORTING F A a S
27.

The Lightner's married in 1997. This wsxf firowed upon, because Marcia
Lighmer had previously worked at Swmson's C o m m i s v as a contract vender,
(Not a Stale Employee).

28.

Even afier they were m&ed, out of just pure m w e s s , the IAi&merswere
denied visiting privi1el;~esfor 2 y w s .
Marcia Lightner had to hire an anorney to assist them in geging their visiting
approved. After 5 months of legal intervention, the Lightners were given their
visiting privileges. But to continue the harassment, they were separated with a glass
partition for another year. It was then a total of 3 years and 5 months of no contact
and normal interaction before the Lightner's were given normal visiting privileges.
Once normal visiting was approveci, the warden, out of continued harassment
and retaliation transferred William to ICC, the newly built correctional facility in
Kuna Idaho where he was severely beaten and locked down into segregation for seven
(7) more months that caused, again, another separation with the Lightners visits.

31.

After seven months of abuse at ICC Marcia Lightner foflowed her husband to
Orofino, when he was transferred out of ICC She rented a home and started
School in Lewiston. This did not deter the prisons attempt to keep the Lightners
separated. This time they moved William to a county jail at the other side of the State
in Idaho Falls ID. That act caused another 11 months of separation before William
was eventually moved back to ICIO.

FIRST A m N D E D CIVIL RIGHTS G O M P L m T -8

32.

For eleven ( I 1 ) years, State prison officials have hw~fiiedand allempted to
sepwate the Li&tner%. This has caused menla1 tomlent, anguish, and depression, not
to mention the cost involved.
Ma-cia tightner poses no secwrity risk. It is simply hamsment to now again
suspend her visits in t k izme of security, from an alleged incident that was not even
at or comected to the prisan,
The Lightners assert that their visitation was suspended for reasons other than
Macia" priding charge. That being, retaliation against the Lightners because they
exercised their fundamental rights perfected by the Constitution to address other
issues they have pending in the courts.

35.

The 14thh e n d m e n t states in part "norshoil any Sfore deprive any person of
'lifi, liher~j,or properg), ~ l i f out
h dzreproce.ss oflar~. The Petitioners claim that
"

Marcia's visitation in liberty interest was interfered with by ISCI officials with out
due Process, and the Petitioners loss of ConsorCiw was being done in retaliation.
Cunquently, this imposes a typical and sigrlifioant hardship on the Lightner's
Marriage in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 111

36.

Claim three (3) is also a violation of Idaho State Constitution Article 13. It
States "No person shall be twice put in jeopar&for the same oflence " The Lightners
visits were suspended for four (4) months in April for Marcia's arrest. To now
suspend them again for the same arrest is Double Jeopardy.

FIRST M E N D E D CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -9

SUPPORTING FACTS
37.

The Lightner's were denied visiting h r n 12 April, 2007 until 20 July, 2007
due to Marcia's 10 April 2007 mest. Then denied again on 1 October 2007 until this
present date.

38.

A&er having missed 4 1 visits. Marcia appealed the legality of the suspension
to Waden h d y Blades. Warden Blades, after concern and reconsideration,
reinstated their visiting privileges and Marcia was notified by telephone from Jeff
Kirkman. that she could resume her visiting with her husband with no restrictions.
JeRKirkrnan mentioned that she would need to keep him up to date of any changes in
her case. hdarcia Lightner did as he asked.

39.

Upon replacing Randy Blades as waden, John Hardison again suspended
Lightners visits for the same April incident. Having iost visiting privileges once
without due process was bad enough but to now lose them a second time for the same
offence is Double Jeopardy.

P ~ V I O U LAWSUITS
S
AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF
The Lightners have sought informal relief from the appropriate administrative
Officials by talking personally, and on the phone to Prison officials when their visits
Were Suspended. Marcia tightner did contact the IDOC for relief with the violation
and was refused and turned away with no resolution to the issues of her concerns.
She was just told that her Rights did not matter to them,

FIRST AMENDED ClVIL RIGHTS COMPLAZNT -10

As ofthe suspnsion inflicted by Warden 13ardison 1 October 2007 the

41,

PlaintiRs have exhausted the prison grievance system and m&ing appeals
with the Corporate IDOC offices. No relief was given. (see atkhed grievmces)

42.

M e n all effbrts failed to get the visiting reinstated, The Li&;tners filed a tort
claim at the S e e r e w of State" Office, and then this civil action,

43.

Plaintis demand trial by jury.

- P U Y E R FOR =LIEFPlaintiffs Pray the Court. to:
(a)

Accept Jurisdie~onof the case;

(b)

That the Court order:
1.

Steve Nelson, $20,000 plus additional $2500.00 per visit, to be calculated per
total loss up to the time the visits are reinstated.

2.

John Hardison, $50,000.00 plus additional $5000. 00 per visit, to be calculated
per total loss up to the time the visits are reinstated.

3.

Director Renke, $50,000.00 plus additiow~$5000.00per visit, to be
calculated per total loss up to the time visits are reinstated.

(c)

That while incarcerated, the Court orders William Lightner MI438 will not be moved

from his current housing assignment. If he is again moved, it would have to be taken as a
serious form

FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLATNT -1 1

of realiation do to filing of this law suit. Willim Li&tncr safe md doing fine
at his cunent housing at ISGI. ( Although this mended cornplaint mentions that Willim
Lightner not be moved, The IDOC has moved him, in April 2008, and He does take this
as a retaliatory action because of filing this law suit.)
(d)

That the Court order the Lighmers receive normal visiting privilege equal to,

other visitors and with out hzssment and rettlliation. And that to deny visiting wi&out
just cause would be considered a contempt of court.

(e)

That the Court order the IDOC to change their visiting Policy and Procedures so

that they reflect Constitutional standards.
(f)

That the Court order defendants to pay all courts costs and fees in this case and

attorneys fees if counsel makes an appearance;
(g)

h p h i n g else the Court feels the Lightners are due or entitled to.

(h)

Finally, that these issues be heard and determined by a jury.
/

Dated this

Dated this

/

day of June 2008

&

day of June 2008
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NO.
A.M

R,XSB #3X89
Lead Depuv, Coae~honsSection
A,
INS=, B
E3 #5275
Deputy Aaomey Gmeral
Idaho Depament of Correc.rion
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110
Boise, Idaho 83706
Telephone (208) 658-2087
Pacsirnile: (208) 327-7485

Anomeys for DefendaaG

TI333 DISTRICT COURT 03'TEE FOURTH JUDIGXAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IIDAHO, IN MXD FOR TI33 COUNTY OF ADA
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M L I G H m R , arid
lMARCXA L X G ~ ~ ? E ~
PlahMs,

1
1
)

1
1
1

V.

JOHN -EON,
STEVE ?XELSON, )
and B3XENT WlaVm,
)
)

Defendants.

Case No. CV OC 0720193

ANSW]ER TO A1MEmED
COM-PLAINTAND JURY
DEIMAND

1

Come Now Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel and hereby answer

and respond to RlaintifPs Amended Civil Rights Complaint ("'Amended Complaint") on
file in this action: Defendants deny each and every allegation in Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint, unless specidcally and expressly admitted herein.
1.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 1.

2,

Answexing the allepdons c o n ~ n e din Paragraph 2, Befendants lack

s&icient knowledge or infomation mcessary to form a belief as to the tmth of the
maMers asserted, and therefore presently deny the same.
3.

hw&g

the allegations contain& inParagaph 3, Det'endants admit that

Defendmt b h k e is the Director of the XZ)OC and to the extent be was acting within the
course and scope of bis employment, he was acting unda color of state law.
4.

Answering the allegations conwed in Paragaph 4, Defendmts admit that

Defendant Hardison is the Warden at ISCl and to the extent he was actkg wit& the
course and scope of his employmen&he was acting under color of state law. Defendants

W e r adonit that as Wsden, Defenant Hadson is the mpervisor of ISCI stafT;
however, Defendants deny any characterization or implication that by virtue of his
position Defendant Hardison is vicariously liable for any alleged conduct of his staff.
5.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragaph 5, Defendants deny the

first sentence tl~tile/reofWith respect to the remainhg allegations, Defendants lack
sufficient knowledge or infonaation necessary to form a belief as to the truth of the
rnatte~sasserted, and therefore presentfy deny the same.
6.

Answering the allegations contained in the Paragraph labeled

"Jurisctiction,'~efendants admit the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983;
however, Defendants deny that Idaho Code 5-201 provides a basis for jurisdiction,
'7.

Answering the alIegations contained in Paragraph 10,Defendants lack

sufficient kaowledge or idomation necessary to f o m a belief as to the truth of the
matters asserted, and therefore presently deny the same.
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8

h w e r h g the crllega~onscontained in Paragraph 11, Defend=& admit

Pfai9tZfMarcia Li&her was mested on or about April 10,2007. Mi& respect lo the
remanmg dlegations, however, Befendme lack sufficient howledge or in-formation
necessav to f o m a belief as to the m t h ofthe- maeers asserted, and &erefore presently
deny the s m e .

9.

h w e r i n g the dlegations contained in P m m p h 12, Defendants admit

only that on or about April 12,2007, PlairtmMzcia Li&ker% visitation privileges
were suspended.

10.

h w e r h g the allegalions contded in Paramph 13, Defendants admit

only that after appro

ly t h e e months of suspmion, Plain~ffMarcia Lightner's

visitation privileges were reinstated. Defmdanb deny all remaining allegations
conuked in this paranaph.

11.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 14, Defendants admit

only that on or about October 1,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's visitation privileges
were suspended. With respect to the remking allegations, Defendants lack sufficient
knowledge or infomation necessary to f o m a belief as to the truth of the matters
~tsserted,and therefore presently deny the same.

12.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 15.

13.

Answertjlg the allegations contained inParagraphs 16 and 17, Defendants

laok sufficient howledge or infomation necessary to form a belief as to the truth of the
matters asserted, and &erefare presently deny the same.
24.

Defendants deny the alXegations contained in Paragraph 18.

ANSWER TO AlMXM)EX) COMPLATNT AND JURY DEltLAMD-3

15.

h s u r e ~ n g&e allega~o~s
contab4 in in~aragaph19, Defend=@ lack

sugicient knowledge or kfomation necessary to f o m a belief as to the huth o f the

matters asserted, asld .t%lereforepresen.tfy deny the same.
16.

Defadaats deny the allega~onscontained in Paragaph 15 [20] and 16

17.

Defendmts admit tbe allegations conbhed in Paragap'h 17 [22].

18.

Defendants deny the alle~fionscontained in Paragraphs 18 [23], 19 [243,

[2Xl.

20 [25j, and 21 [26].
19.

Answering the allegations conkind in Paraaaph 22 [27], Defendants

admit the allegations contained in the %st sentence thereof, DefendmW deny all
remaining allegations contained in this paragraph,
20.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 23 [28] and 24

21.

hswenng the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 [30],Defendants

[291.

admit only that PlaintiEs were not given a bearing prior to suspension of Plaintiff Marcia
Li&tner's visitation privileges, Defendants deny all rmaining allegations contained in
this paraaaph, specihcally including any chmcterization or implication that Plaintiffs
had a due process right in their visiting privileges.
22.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 [3 11.

23.

Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 [32],Defendants

admit only that Plaintiff Marcia Lightner previously worked for an D O C contract
vendor. With respect to the remaining allegations, howeke< Defendants lack sufficient

ANSWER TO AMIEN1)EX) C O M P L m AMD JURY DEMAND--4
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knowledge or igfomtion necessa;ry to fern a belief as to the mfi of the matters
asserted, and &erefore presently deny the sme.
24.

Befendaats deny the d l e g a ~ o mconhined in Paragaph, 28 [33 1.

25.

Answerhg the aIlega~onscontained in Paragraph 29 [34], Defendants

lack sufficient bowledge or Momation necessary to form a belief as to the tmt?.~of the

matters asserted, mci &mefare presently deny the s m e ,
26.

Defenrlants deny the allega2ions conained in Paragraph 30 [35].

27.

Answering the allega~onsconbhed in Paragaph. 3 1 [36],with respect to

the first sentence, D e f e n h t s lack sufficient knowledge or infomation necessary to form

a belief as to the truth of the m a ~ e masserted, and therefoxe presenay deny the same.

D e f e n b t s deny all m m a i ~ dlegations
g
conhhed inthis parapph.
28.

Defendmts deny the allega.tions contained in Paragraphs 32 [37], 33 [38],

34 [39J, 35 [40] and 36 f4.11.

29.

Answehg the allega~onscontained in Paragraph 37 [42], DefendaaQ

admit the allegations contained in the first sentence thereof, Defendants deny all
remaining allegations c o n b e d in this paragraph.
30:

Answering the allegations conQined in Paragraph 38 [43], Defendants

admit only that Warden Blades tmporarily reinstated PIaintiffs' visiting privileges.

Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained in this paragraph.

3 1.

hswenjy: the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 [44], Defendants

admit only that PlaintiBs' visiting privileges were suspended by Defendant Hardison.

Defendants deny all remainhg allegations contained in this paragraph.

ANSWER TO m N D E D COIVIPLAINT AMo JURY D E W - 5
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32,

Answaing the allegations coIxr&ed in Paramph 40 c4.53, Defendants

a d ~only
t that Plainties had some conlact with D O C oEciaXs xegar&g their visitation

privileges; however, Defendants d e ~ any
y cbaacterimtion or implica~onthat Plaintiffs
have exhallstad the a d a s t r a t i v e grievance process.
3 3,

Defeadmts deny the a l l e m ~ o mcontained inP a a p p h 4 1 [46].

34.

Answering the alle~tr'onscontained in Paragraph 42 [47], Defendants

admit only that Plaintiffs filed a notice of tort claim prior to filing this action.

35.

A n s w e ~ the
g allegations contained in Paragaph 43 [48], Defendaiits

achowledge that IPfahWs have demanded a jury trial,
36.

Aaswkng the allegations contained inthe Paragraph labeled ""Prayer for

Relief,'~Dentlmtsdeny all allegations contained in subparagraphs (a) though @)
thereof.

FIRST DEFENSE
Defendan@have not been able to engage in sufficient discovery necessary to
learn all of the facts and oircumstances relating to the matters described in Plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint and therefore request the COW to permit Defendants to amend their
Answer and assert additional affmative defenses or abandon a m a t i v e defenses once
discovery has been completed.
3ECOND DEFENSE

That Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a cause o f action against the
Defendants upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DEFENSE
That the allegations contained in the Pl~ntiBs%ended Co~nplaintdo not rise to
the level of a depl^ivationof rights that are protected by the Constihr~anor any of the

legs1 provisions ref"erred to in the P l a h ~ E s m e n d e dComplainl,

That Defendants acted in a reasonable and prudent fmhion satisQing any d ~ ~ tify ,
any, "chat they owed under Lhe rules, ree;ulations, satutes, ordhances, customs, policies

and usages the State of Idaho m#or the United States of America.
FIBTB[ DEFENSE

That Defendmts are b u n e from 1iabiE~
because the acts or omissions
coqlained of, if any, were done by DefeadmQ in good faith, with hhoncst, reasonable
belief that such actions were necessary and l a f i f . at the time they occurxed.
SIXTH DEPENSE

That Defendants are h u e , or have qualified imunity., to the allegations
contained in the Plaintiffs' Arnmded Complaint.

SIEWWH DEFENSE
A11 general h ~ t i e statutory
s
or otherwise applicable.

EIGHTH DEPENSE
Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the available adrninistfative remedies, and
oaerxrise failed to comply with available administrative remedies.

To the extent that the Plaintiffs are asserting state law clahs, the liability, if any,
o f Defendants for any state law claims or causes of action is limited pursuant to the

provisions of the Td&o Tort C X ~ m
Act, In assehng this defense, Defendmts are in no
way conceding ox a d d ~ Iiabilily.
g

To the extent that the P f h H f s are a s s e ~ state
g law claims against:Defendmts,

some or all af such clGm are basred since they arise out of andlor stem Erom activities
for which D e f e n b t s ilre -me

from liability by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho

Tort Claims Act,

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
To the extent that the P l a h ~ f f are
s asserting state law claims against Defendants,

some or all of such claims axe barred by fhefailure of the PlaintifFs to comply with the
Idaho Tort Claians Act.
TWELFTH DEFENSE

That Defendants are not liable in litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 9 1983, for any

injury caused by the act or omission of another person under the theory of rapondeat
superior.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
That the claims and damages set forth in the Plaia.tiffsYAmended Complaint are

barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

F O m m E N T B DEFENSE
.

That Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the bonding requirement set forth in

Idaho Code 5 6-610,

ANSWER TO M M ) E D COMPLAINT AND 3URY D E W - - 8
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n a t some or all of P I a k ~ f f s k I a h for
s declacratoy aad injunctive relief are
moot.

That PlaktifiEs have f ~ l e to
d tig gate tlxeleir dmlages, if my.

R a E 11
PlaktiEs' clainls are brou&t f~volouslyitnd weasonably and are not well
grounded in fact or law and Defendan@are entitled to sanctions against Plahtiffs
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure.
JURY DE-

Defendants, p m a n t to Rule 38@) of t.he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby
demands a trial by jury.

AnO-Y

FEES

Defendants have been required to retain attorneys in order to defend this action
and are entitled to rwover reasonable attorney fees pursuaat to federal and state law and
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

WBNFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and

that the Plainties take nothing thereunder.

2.

That the Defendants be awarded their costs, izlcluding reasonable

attorneys' fees pursuant to state and federal law, including 42 U.S.C. tj 1988, Idaho Code

$8 6-918A, 12-117, 12-121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

That judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims for relief.
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4,

For such other and

Respectfully submiaed this

er relief as the Court deems just &ndequitable

/ %ay

of July, 2008.
STATE OF DAHO
OFFICE OF' TI332 ATT

Deputy Attorney General,
Counsel for Defendmts

CERTmlCAm OF SERVICE
1IXEZWBY c j e R m Y that on the

/ &day

of July, 2008,1 caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWR TO AMEmED C O M P L W AND
JURYDEMA.ND on:

Willi~mLifShtner,# 41438
Idalxo Conectiond Center
P.O.Box 70010
Boise, I
D 83707
Via Prisan Mail *stem
AND

Marcia LighWr
300 E. 41" Street
Garden City, ID 83714
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WILLIAM LIGHWER MI438
1CG WIT-C
PO BOX 70010
BOISE, IDAHO 83707
1A LlGHmER

G-EN

CITY, IDAHO 83714

PLAMTIFFS PRO, SE
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICLAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WILLIAM LlGHTNER , MARCLA LIGHINER
Plaintiffs,

1
1

-vs.JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REIN=,
NELSON,
Defendants,

1
1

)

STEVE

Case No. CV OG 07- 20193
mSPONSIE AND OBJECTION TO
STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
SODGMENT W T H MFmAVITS
IN SUPPORT

1
1
1
1
)

COMES NOW, Willianz and Marcia Lightner, Plaintiffs Pro se, hereby submits their ''RESPONSE

AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT." Based on the reasons stated
below, Plaintiffs request that the court denies the Motion for S

w Judgment, and this case proceed to trial.

I. LNTRODUCTION
This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff William Lightner is an Idaho State
prisoner. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner is his wife. Plaintiffs (William and Marcia) claim that their constitutional
rights were violated when ldaho Department of Correction (IDOC) officials terminated Marcia's visiting

privileges without Due Process of Law, and then violated the Double Jeopardy clause, by suspending the
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT-I-
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Li&tners visibtion a second time far the

orighal oEence.

11. S T A T E m m OF FACTS
1.

William is an IDOC prisoner who was housed at the Idaho State Comectional Institution (ISCI)

hou&out the time frme of this claim. (See PlaintiEs%Edav=1.ls in Suppo&).

2.

Marcia was a regular visitor, visiting her husbad, Willim three (3) times a week allowed and approved

by ZSCI. (See Ex4libit H of Hardison's AAFibvit for a copy of Marcia's visiting log).

3.

On 10 April 2006 Marcia was arrested at her home and released from custody on 11 April 2006.

subsequent to that arrest, Warden Blades and Deputy Warden Christensen, suspended Marcia's visiting
privileges.

4.

Afler three months of suspended visits, and personal c o m ~ c a t i o between
n
Marcia and k d e n

Blades, PlgntiRs visits were reinstated by warden Blades in July 2007.
5.

Around October 2007, 'Warden Hardison had replaced Warden Blades as warden at ISCI. On 1 October

2007 Warden Hardison suspended Marcia's visit's a second time for her April arrest, even when requested, a
due process hearing was denied regarding the loss of privileges. (See attachment-A, Oet. 1,2007
correspondence fiom Hardison terminating visitation).

HI S U M m R Y JUDGMIENT STANDARD
6.

Under the Idaho Rules of Procedure, Summary Judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. I.R.C.P. 56 (c); Student Loan
Fund v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45,49,95 1 P. 2d. 1272 (1998). The burden falls in the moving party to prove the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.D.A.R.. Inc v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141,143-44,997
P. 2d 602 (2000).
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I V ARGUMENT
A.

Deferzliant argues i h t GYilliam k claim is :burred due to hisfuilure to exhaust the IDOC
grievuuce process.

6.

I,

ISGl has a gievaulce procedme, This procedure is contajned in IDOC Division of Prisons Staniiard

Opemting Procedme 3 16.02.01.OO1 (SOP 316). The complete ~ e v a n c procedwe
e
consists of three steps.
a) Using a 'Toncem form" to seek out an informal resolution with the staff member closest to the
incident.
b) Complete a ""Grievance fom"if informal resolution can not be accomplished between the involved

parties.
In most instances, Concern forms are sent to various ConeclJonal officers (CO's) or various prison areas
(Comissary, Laundry etc). A grievance on the other hand adds a reply f?om a Sgt. or Lt. and then is either
"Granted or '*Modified, by a reviewing authority such as the deputy warden.
c) An "Appeal" to the grievance response to the "Appellate Authority" who is typically the head of the

facility, generally referred to as "'Warden'bho makes the final ruling as the chief appellate authority.
7.

In this instance there was no grievance procedure possible. The person most closely related to the

incident where the initial concern would be sent, is the same person as the final "Appellate Authority" who was
available at ISCl to appeal the Warden's decision to? (See William Lightner's Affidavit in Support)

8.

Even if Plaintiff had not pursued the grievance process, S m a r y Judgment should not be granted,

because there are disputed issues of material facts involved that preclude sumxnary judgment. In the case of
Harris v.Ford, 32 F. Supp 2d 1109 (D. AK 1999) the court held that where the claim did not relate to prison
conditions, the PLRA exhaustion was not required prior to filing a lawsuit. The court ruled that a court's duty to
screen prisoner complaints does not require it to do such screening in writing to the defenbts, and that the
prisoner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA because his claims did not
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relate to prison eon&tions.
9.

In this case the

is true. Plain~Esare not mmplaining abaut prison conditions. They are

chdlenging the constitu~onallegality of the IDOC Policy md Proceduse, and claiming that their constimtional
rights were violated due to then questionable Policies.
10.

F d e m o r e , the in-house gfievance process could not possibly challenge the validity of IDOC Policy

and Procedure, nor deternine if Com~wtionalri&ts were violated. This is because there are no impartial
reviews of the Mevances by non-IDOG officials. A blue-shield has been implemented by the defendants that
prevent a close insption of any regulation review.( See PlainiiEsm&vi&
11.

in S u p p ~ ) .

In the defendauts motion for s m a y judment they list a n m k r of cases in which summary judment

was granted for lack of exhaustion of a grievance process, yet as they would attempt to lead the court to believe,
this is NOT always the case,
12.

The disirict court dismissed a claim of d e a l t h y air in a prison for failure to exhaust remedies, Bishop

v. Lewis 155 F. 3d 1094 (9thcir. 1998). Appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the PLRA
exhauslion of adminish.ative remedies provision did not apply retroactively, and found that the prisoner
substantially complied with court order to exhaust internal prison remedies.
13.

Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 Q4.D. IL, 1997): The Court found that cell temperatures ranging

from 32" to 50° for extended periods of time violated the Eight Amendment, and the court reksed to apply the
exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the PLRA.
14.

Miller v. Thombwh, 755 F. Supp 980 (D.Ks 1991):The court held that Habeas Corpus petitioner did

not have to exhaust all available administrative remedies as such remedies exhausted only where issues
involving control and management of a prison were involved, but petitioner was challenging the underlying
Constitutional validity of the basis for his transfer and incarceration in another prison.
15.

Since the current claim originated actions of the ISCI warden, there was no ISCI grievance process

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY XIDGMENT4-

000057

8F;OOOO

- S - ~ 3 V V W f l fA W W f l S ?I02 NOILOW S3LV.LS 0.lNOIL33180 CINV 3SNOdS3X

pgy ay ~ r uos!pm~
q
uapsM Aq pau.81~raga1 T! q p uo!fquammp dq uo~suadsnss g PaMOlfOJ uayj 'rarrly817
T!r3nM 03 1@3auoyd I? Aq S$!s!A s,I?!3SeyY papuadsns uos!pm~ uapst?Masnmaq 'afqi[fe~r!
ssamrd a ~ m ~ a p 8
ON s r ! a&aqL
~
.8q)!s!a u! sura1qordjo 3uap!3q puoyppr! d m lnorqps u ~ %
papuadsns SVM 8ug1sp1s,a!3m~q
)r!qu a p s e l!~' s a p r ! ~'qq
~ ~a3qdar 01 uapmM 1 3 ~ 1 uogrsod
~0
arq JaAo yo01 u o s r p z ~uapmfi uayl\L\

'61

.(troddns m 1 ~ ~ ~ 7 , g r d
s,;tau~y8!? e!DmF/y 93s) 'sape1a u a p m ~
ICq pa~mu!a~
s e %ql!s!~
~
s,r!!3n~/y pm 'saprr~guapmM rqm passaqpr!
SVM s s a ~ o ~
a~utz~a@I
d
ay;L '9002

p d v 01 papuadsns 8qaq 3s.n~8 u q s ! ~s,rauly8g ~!!mqqVIM

'81

'(6# %!ATIWbT ~o@u~u!w)

peay Ai!l'mj ayl sr! ,,&porqnv at ell add^,^ lsaqtq a p s! uapmM ayLC .pasnoy s! ay uognjgm! arq JO u a p m ~
arfl
qp spua s p a d d ~pm surauor, ar,m~a@03 ssa3~r!stq 'ay~ururpal~ra~m3u1
m? sy ram@!? mrlllfi
' u o s j ap~

.(voddns u1 p ~ " p g vS

sv

-L1

m q u p x s~utlyuafca(J Z ~ ! D ~~ lDj l q 3~ @ J u ? D ~ ~ %I

S J J ~ aas)
U ~ ~'a3y
~

sry r q y U O ~ ~ W I S ~ A SJ OS O ~a q j o asne3aq emt?r)pm

ZuauuoJ jmoyoma auraslxa pasaps my -~~q%i3fr[
t x m g ~ g! ~y u p ~ dy t t s ~ ~arq
t l urog passywsrp aq jou p~noys
m.Ilq8!7

W!~?M
B f W I d '~WN

0s Sa3Wm3J!3 uaqM sluaura~mba~
mid arfl pajsnqxa $ou amy p?q

s q e p 3ufzroddnsfie1 am= W!M. fS~~-orqna
~w1laddrtp a y sa!2!I!sej
ou sy aJarq

arq as~all.ey:,01 a ~ q ud! 1C.;srlodaam~ap.8

saJeamourap pm ' 3 3 ~p ~~ a j m
JO anss! 1gua!4w!~m03 rr mq '(s~~PI!A;u~
UO!I~!S~A

S,~JIM

s!y JQ uo!leufmal a p Lruo tnq) suo!lpuos uosyd fauxura3uo3IOU s~l!ns ,sgt~upld~ ~ q 1 3 aqlol
3 ~ 3 aria

+91

'(voddns u1 s l ~ ~ l z ,ps gy !~~~u ~a~ad~ .ICluo%ne
)
aigf~ddg
puy ay7 sf uapmm a q
ltlyr ams Alzal:, suo!~eldaraarf~st? 01 paid@m m ~ a yr?f fsly 0) auo ou ~ F Ma.rarq 'aag~sfy y l r t~q s p s ~ ~ ~ r n l d
*

paJGu!uU:aJ uos!pm~u a q '~m u .sasm~a@Ma!AaJ
tflqUI p3Jtr)s SVy a v a x $ w a J q '3F!aX

a1 sips

.JyY

IOU

.

saop aq ~ r r qd~l p q ~ p
am
~ s ~ a ~ sapo1~8aua)q
sm

suospd~oJ O j 3 3 B Q 3 q Oj

a3&0 3 8 8 1 1"s"33y;FO U!32UI

3y)

auoqdala~pm a a ~ apwoj
l
Aq pa1adr;le sg!lu?z!ld - 8 u q 3s- wau ayl p!p sg!j~pjd . ~ I ~ G [ ~ A T !

suswnded the visits, Beings W ~ d e nHardimn is comidered the

&evanee proeess, a d he bad d r e d y

made the decision to suspend the visits, there was no f d e r ~ e v m m
left for WiHiam to do. (See PlaintiNFs"
Asdavit in Suppa).
20.

Director Rei&e was:
a)

aware of the nature of the Li&her% claims

b)

wa9 idam4 of the issues and concerns.

c)

hari the power as an appellate authority to review the claim.

However, Reinke chose to do nothing.
21.

As the IDOC Director, it is Reinke's job and responsibility to be an appellant authority on issues

involving insrihirional wardens. Rehke's actions were done deliberately so as to not make him criminally
negligent and nor show deliberate indifference.
22.

In McDade v. West, 223 F. 3d 1135, 1140 (9h cir.2000): The court held that the employee acted under

State law for 1983 p w s e s "she invoked the power of her office to accomplish the offensive act. Therefore,
however improper Ms. West's actions were, they clearly related to the perfbmance of her official duties.
23.

When Mr. Reinke refused to meet with Marcia, he invoked the power of his office staff to "Get rid of

her" clearly shirking the performance of his official duty. A Director of a governmental agency should always
be willing to review any and all issues that he or she is in control of in order to become aware of any unethical

or constitutional behavior or abuse of Policy and procedure he or she is directed to uphold according to law.
(See Plaintiffs' Affidavits In Support).
24.

Kimes v. Stone, 84 F. 3d 1121, 1127 (9&cir. 1996): The Court held that "conduct by persons acting

under color of state law which is wrongfdly under 42 USC 1983... Cannot be immunized by State law. .. and
the summary judgment clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced." To not
include Director Reinke as a defendant due to his willful ignoring the claim would be clearly contrary to the
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htent of 1983, which is to enable a p m n deprivd of &eir civil rights "to r m v e r M1 eompeMion from the
g o v e m e n a officids respmible for those deprivadons." Gmes, Id.

25.

112 SGT 1827 (1992): The

se of 1983 is to deter State actors fLom using the badge

of their au&ority to d e p ~ v eindividds of their fededly guaranteed md constitutionally protected rights and
privileges and to provide relief to v i e h s .

26.

PlaintiEs claim that their C o m ~ t t r t i o dRi&&

were violated when they were denied a due process

hearing, and for the claim of double jeopardy. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner specificdly stated to the head of IDOC
J e E W u t a , officer representing d e f e n b t Reide, that the prison directives of Policy and Procedures were
unconslihtiod by not including due process procedures. (See Narcia Lightner's Affidavit In Support).
27.

Defendmt Reinke is liable since he is the convening authority, is responsible for the actions of 'Wasden

under his control, and for the preparation of Policies and Procedures given to the institutions. Mr. Reinke holds
a position to assist and assert change under his direction and discretion if change is necessary to assist that
institutional integrity and to protect State law. (See William Lightner's Affidavit In Support).

C.

28.

The denial of Mrs. L i g h e r k visiting privileges violated her Constitutional Rights.

Walker v. S m e r , 14 F. 3d 1415 (9&cir. 1994): Facts as to whether inmate was denied right to produce

witnesses in his defense at a DOR proceeding violated due process and precludes summary judgment.
29.

Nationwide, it has been clearly established that inmates convicted of prison offences are entitled to due

process hearings. The Constitution guarantees that a person is entitled to due process before punishment is to be
administered. Plajntigs were denied this fundamental right. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner was punished prior to
ever being convicted of any wrongdoing, which flies in the face of the "innocent until proven guilty" standard
our laws are based upon. (See Marcia Lightner's Asdavit In Support).

30.

Plaintiffs claim that the loss of visitation privileges is punishment, As such, requires a due process
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h ~ n g Also
.
that lDOC visihg Policies are unmmtibtiond for not including due p r m s pprocedures as
required by Izatt v. Anderson, U.S. District Court St-ipdatedApement c o n e ~ n visibtion
g
te~naljon
procedwes.

3 1.

If h a t e s afe enlitled to due process for prison rule viola~onand have lost many of their rights, how

d loss of privileges.
much more shodd Marcia Li&tner be entitled to due process before being p ~ s h e with

32.

In anoher case dealing with the liberty interest of visitation issues, the court ruled that in order to create

a protmed liberty interest in the prison context, state redations must use explicitly mandatory lmgmge in
connection with the eshblishent of specific subsmtive predicates to "Limit OEcial Discretion", there by
requiring that a particular outcome be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria was met. See Kentucky

DOC v. Thompson, 490 US 454 (1 989). See also Smith v. Couahlin, 748 F. 2d 783 (2nd cir. 1984).
33.

A prison regulation may infringe or threaten a constimtiond interest, as applied to a particulas protected

expression, if the regulation is legitimately related to pendogical goals or interests, but the court must balance
the importance of the prisoners f i n g e d right against the importance of penalogical interest and inquire
whether the rule is an exaggemted response. Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F. 3d 112I (9*b cir. 1999).
34.

It is clear that Warden Blades had no problem complying with the law, and it is obvious that Defendant

Hardison's temimtion of Marcia Lightner's visits was an exaggerated response, or at the least a power-trip
Defendant Hardison felt like enjoying. (See Plaintiffs'AAftTidavit in Support).
35.

According to defendants Motion for Surnmary Judgment, there was an excessive cost of manpower and

prison recourses to allow continued visitation, yet a full-time hearing oAftTicer is on staff to afford other inmates
their Due Process rights at DOR hearings.

36.

Plaintiffs had their visits suspended twice for the same alleged offence, and was deprived of liberty

without due process which violates the First, Fifth and Fourteenth h e n h e n t s to the U.S. Constiturion. (See
Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Support).
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37.

Pl&nti@swere s o m e d of waden's deeision to s w p n d visit-ation privileges but tlrere not conkonled

with any w i ~ s e alleging
s
some Ibrm of wongdoing agknst them, nor given the o p p & ~ t to
y present
~;lnessesin their behalf, or given the opp&mity to have an impmid he

review official to chdlenge

Hardison's actions. (See Pl&ntiEs7AE&vit in Suppr"l).
38.

To violate a pemon" sights and privileges and deny h w b a d and wife visibtion without just cause, and

without due process is cruel and unusud gunisbent in violation of rbe 8h Annex~hent.

39.

No State shall deprive any person of their liberty wifiout a due process of law as clearly held by the

Amenbent, unless there is a clear penologcal reason. If there was a s e c ~ t concern,
y
then obviously Blades
felt it was very slight or he would not have reinsmed Plaintiffs' visit-ation.
40.

By abinistering pur?isbent in taking away Plaintiffs visiting ri&s and privileges twice of the same

alleged oEence, and wiLhout a due process hearing, defendants violated Plaintiffis I", 5th, 8th, and 14'h
Amenhent rights to the U.S. Constitution.
41.

Courts have ruled in prior cases that the termination of family visitation to inmates was unconstitutional.

Laudter v. Kay,-986 F. Supp 1362 (D. UT 1997), and that due process is required in prison settings O ~ a s o
v. Hey, 113 F. Supp 2d 405 (E. D. NY 2000), see also, Hardaway vb. Ken, 573 F. Supp 419 (W.D. WI 1983).

D.
42.

In this case w e n d a n t s are not entitled to qualified immuni&

"The substantial defense accorded prison officials does not relieve federal courts &om their duty to

ensure that prison officials actions are not exaggerated responses to prison concern.. . (at 1200) and "Prison
authorities cannot frame and then improperly discipline prisoners for exercising their constitutional rights."
h e c h t v. Collins, 903 F. Supp 1193 ( S.D. OH 1995).
43.

In the case of Cuthrie v. Darosa. 1998 WL 227 15, at 4 (ND CA 1998) the court held that Defendants

must establish that the correctional action taken would have taken place regardless of prisoner's protected
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conduct or that the reaiatory act w a

wly I%jloredto serve legitimte pedogical purpose. Momt Eledth~

,429 U.S. 274 (1977).
44.

The court a%mdthe Supreme C o w %decision that the Tumer standard applies to all Constitutional

claims arising in prison with the exception of 8th h e n b e n t claims. Ward v. W&b 1 F. 3d 873 (9* cir 1993).
45.

Knowing that even DOR pmeedings require a due process hearing, Defendants should have h o r n

Plaintiffs were entitid to the

right. The Court held in Johnson v. Goombe. 2001 WL 617539 (S.D. NY

2001) That h a t e s had a constitutional right to call ~Wesses,who prison officials r e h e d to call, and any
reasonable person involved should have known about the right to call witnesses, the right to present evidence
and the right to an impmid hearing examiner. Thus, the case should proceed and no qualified iinmunity should
be available to the officials. (See Pl&ti@s9 Affidavit in Support).

46.

Officiais were denied qualified imrnunity in Verser v. Elvea. 113 F. Supp 2d 1211 (N. D. IL 2000)

because, "... a plaintiff need not use magic words like 'keckless" or "intentional" to make out a case for
deliberate indiEerence. He must merely plead that the Defendant's behaved in a way that can be construed to
show reckless or intentional conduct.
47.

When Plaintiff% requested for a due process hearing was denied, defendants willfklly and deliberately

violated the plaintirs rights and "therefore is not entitled to immunity.
48.

"Clearly Established" does not mean that an official action is protected by qualified imrnunity unless the

very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the
d k m l n e s s must be apparent. Wilson v. Lame, 526 US 603,609 (1999). What is "Clearly Established" is
that the Constitution guarantees due process hearings. Ooly prison officials who have no knowledge are
qualified to imrnunity Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F. 2d 500 (8" cir. 1990).
49.

Cause of Action claim I1 of Plaintiffs suit was for retaliation. In the case of Bloch v, Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673

(6thcir. 1998) it is clearly established that qualified immunity is inapplicable for retaliation claims. (See
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153 F. 36 564 (7" cir- 1998)

In

oficids

we^

aat en~tlcxfto qualified

h m e t y b e c a w execu~veabuse of power uSh0ckd the &mien== in that case, the d e ~ n was
e denied
access to courts for 57 days. In this
Defendm& willingly and ho*gly

5 1.

however, &fendan& iatent was to deny due p

pmmently.

148 F. 3d 103 1 (8"h cir. 1998).

violat4 Pl&n&Rsti*

Under Sate law, an oficial and the entity that employs the oficia) may be liable for unla*l

acts if the

officials know that the act is d a d 1 or if there is some notice sufficient to put him,as a remnable man, under
duty to investigate the conduct in question. PiaintiEs pemndly tried to make contact with the Director in order
to discuss with ofEcials of the error and unl

act, but Defendants failed to correct the &awful act, m&ng

them liable for damages. Martinez v. Citcv of Las Angeles, 141 F. 3d 1373 (9&cir. 1998). Lucas v. Parish of
Jefferson, 999 F. Supp 839 (E. D. LA 1998). Taylor v. Sullivm, 980 F. Supp 697 (S.D. NY 1997). Dennis v.
Thurman, 959 F. Supp 1253 (G. D. CA f 997).

52.

PlaintiBs have claimed that the ISCI Policy of not giving a due process hearing violated their rights. In

Willims v. Greifinner, 97 F. 3d 699 (ZAcir n 1996) "Reasonable Belief" by Defendants that challenged policy
did not violate inmates rights does not provide a qualified &unity
53.

defense.

The case of Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F 36 434 (gthcir, 1996) fits the Plaintiffs current case,

whether a governmental offrcial is entitled to qualified immunity turns on a two part inquiry, one of which
states:
a)

Was the law governing the officials conduct clearly established?

'I'he right of due process is so clearly established that it is included in multiple Amendments of the Bill
for Rights. Another claim of the Plaintiffs is that of Double Jeopardy, another well established claim.
Defendant Hardison knew that Plaintiffs visits had already been suspended, and knew he was suspending them
again for a second time without legitimate penalogical foundation. He also knew that he made the decision and
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carried &ou& without f l o r h g PlajntiEs the right to due process.
54.

The 1.D.O.C. takes the position that h a i n @ of any due process are not given when there are concerns

of ktitutiond secusif;y. However, the Pl&~-Ffscontend that the US Consti~tionprovides Due Prwess above

and beyond any other State Policy and Procedure. A person is imment until fowid guilty, and just because
Marcia Li@tner was c h g e d with a felony, she was not convicted of me, neither at the t h e of the visiting
suspension or at the conclusion of her case. (See Marcia Li&ber's Affidavit In Support).
55.

The d e f e n h t s ornit a vital point that the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Bock, 127 SCT 910

(2007). The Supreme Court stated that the prisons grievance system could be such as to "rip7' up the prisoner
while they are trying to pursue the grievance process. This is true here as the grievance procedures do not
explain how one is to grieve an action made by the highest grievance appellate authoriq. There is no oversight
review of the warden's actions that are available to the Plaintiffs. (See PlaintifEs' Affidavits in Support).

E.
56.

Pluintzrs are not ulleging a "respondentsuperior" argument:

D e f e n h t s argue that Plaintiffs are raising a "respondeat superior" claim. (Page-9 of Defendants'

Memorandum). This is simply untrue. Plaintiffs are claiming that Re&e is the supervising authority over the
other defendants, and as such knew or should have known that Hardison's actions violated Plaintiffs' rights but
failed to make a policy change or take other actions to prevent the foreseeable violations. See &>onev. Elrod,
706 F.Supp. 636,638 (N.D. 111.1989); Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F.Supp. 1193,1204 (D. Mass. 1982).
57.

Plaintiffs are raising a "Supervisor Liability" claim because the evidence herein clearly establishes a

strong inference that Reinke knew of the lower officials' unlawful actions and willfully failed to intervene to
prevent or correct the unlawful acts. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support).
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I;:
58.

The policies as applied to Plaint~xswas an =agerated respome:

PIabtiEs agree that prison officials have wide latitude in creating regulations gove&ng visitation.

However, the regulations 1.) must be evenly enforced a d not

upon the w b s of an officials pemonal

beliefs; 2.) clearly wriaen so that the prisoner usldersmds the remlal-ions; and 3.) the regulation cannot be used
as an exaggerated response to some minor or none existent
59.

%ion.

Defendmt Hardison applied the visiting policy in an exaggerate& m m e r when he over-road Waden

Blades7reinstatement of Plaintiffs' visiting. Such exaggerated response has been held mconstitutian;xl in
Hargis v. Foster, 312 F3d 404 (9" Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs had been visiting for many month prior to Nardison
taking over the Warden position, vvithout incident warranting termination of the visits. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit

in Support).
60.

The Defendants' reliance upon Ove.rt.on v. B u e t t a , 539 US 126 (2003) is not applicable as there is no

dispute that they may create reasonable regulations governing visitation.

G.

6 1.

Hardison and Reink do not huve qudified immunify;

Hardison cannot claim he did not know that Blades had reinstated PlaintiE's visits after a thorough

review of the facts behind the initial termination of Plaintiffs' visits. Once Plaintiffs' visits were reinstated all of
Plaintiffs' rights to the liberty interest in visitation kicked into play, and Hardison's termination of the visits after
his taking over as Warden was an exaggerated response without legitimate penological concerns. Hargis, supra.
(See Plaintiffs'Affidavit in Support).
62.

The prison officials can be held liable for money damages if the conduct violated "clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Anderson v. Creighton, 483
US 635,639 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800,818 (1982); Vaurrhn v. Ricketts, 859 F2d 736 (9" Cir.
1988); Kelly v. Borg, 60 F3d 664,666 (9&Cir. 1995); Newel1 v. Sauser, 79 F3d 115,117 (9&Cir. 1996);
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Osolimki v. Kme, 92 FJd 934 (!Ig
Gir.
h1996);
63.

supm at pgph. 50 iibove.

Also, as a maaer of law, a Court that deternines wheher d e f e n h t s can rely on qualified h m i t y

should consider dl relevmt legal precedent, not just those cases cited by the parties. Elder v. Hollowav, 114
SCT 1019 (1994).

H.
64.

PPlaitzYMarcia Lightner 's cornortiam claim is not homed;

Defendants p r e m a ~ e l yargue that Plaintiff Willim Lightner has failed to exhaust his grievances which

in turn causes Mrs. Lighmr's consortim claim to be barred. As Plaintiffs pointed out above, Plaintiffs pursued

every possible e h m t i o n where available. The Defendants have the burden of "proving that there is an
inisbative process that would be able to take action in response to [the specific] complaht-action, that is,
other than saying, 'Sorry, we can't do anything about it."' Rahirn v. Sheaban, 2001 WL 1263493 at *6-7 and n.3
(N.D. 111. Oct. 19,2001); Marvin v. Goord, 255 F3d 40'43 (2d Cir. 2001).

65.

It's been held that Courts should require substantiation that an administrative procedure on its face

affords relief for a particular type of complaint before dismissing a prisoner's claim for non-exhaustion. See
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F3d 570,580 (7& Cir. 2005)(holding that prison oficials had not established an
available remedy where nothing "clearly identifie[d]"how to chaflenge certain decisions). Nowhere in the
regulations is there an available avenue to grieve warden Hardison's actions since he is the final appellate
authority, leaving his action ungrievable. (See Plaintiffs' -davit
66.

in Support).

Therefore, Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's consortium claim are still available and warrant consideration by

both this court and the jury. (See Marcia Lightner's Asdavit in Support).

RESPONSE AND OBJECTlON TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY SUDCMENT-14-

000067

SUMTION
67.

PlajnriEs' First, Fi&, and Fourtan&, h e n h e n t s ofthe U S . Cometuhon have k e n violated by the

IDQC officials without any remorse. Both Plaintiffs had our visits suspended twice without any due process
based upon an alleged chage, in which the IDOC o a c i d s toak no responsibili~for their wrong doing. To
continrtiilly de@ a person due process shows a lack of respect for the law of the land. To hold themselves above
the law of the land displays comption in the body of the govement, which itself c d e s the burden to stand
for justice and integrity. W e n integrily fails vvithin the system, the system does not stand a chance to correct
itself. It and all within it will fails all those they are trying to correct kcause they do not set a good example for
the very law they are trying to uphold.

68.

Plaintiffs have suffered injury and seek a remedy for those injuries. The Defendants have a history for

continued harassment of Plaintiffs by repetitive tednation of visits. Continued discovery in this case will
prove Plaintiffs' claims are valid and clearly supported.

V. CONCLUSION
Wherefore, as Pl&tiEs%ve

clearly identified material issues of fact that preclude s w v

judgment the DefendantsWotion should be denied and the case scheduled for jury trial.
RespectfUlly Submiaed this $' day of December, 2008.

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 15-

000068

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a (sue md correct copy of the foregokg MSPONSE AND OBJECTION

TO STATESWOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH WFIDA-TS

IN SUPPORT was mailed

to:

Mmk Kubimb
Deputy Aeomey General
Defendants Counsel
IDOG Suite 110
1299 N. orchard st,
Boise, ID 8 3 7 v
ystem, Dated ths

ay of December, 2008.

RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-16-

C L . 'BW(31" OITER

BRENT REINKE

Marcia Lightner
/*

-3ddf

Boise, ~ V g f f e e6afdw

'I
~J'
a37/y

October 1,2007
Mrs. Lightner,
I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding your visiting privileges including
the arrangement you had with Warden Blades. I regret to inform you that I am
reversing the decision to allow you to continue to visit your husband pending the
outcome of your pending criminal charges.
My decision is based on what is clearly defined in visiting policy 604 that states:

Termination of Visiting Privileges
Visitation privileges may be terminated at the discretion of the facility head
or designee for any length of time, including permanently, for violation or
atiempted violation of any state or federal law, any Board rule, Policy and
Procedure, SOP, field memoranda, or failure to follow staff instructions
(emphasis added).
The policy does allow for consideration on a case-by-case basis for immediate
family of the offender with felony arrests within the iast five (5) years to be
determined by the facility head. As the appellant authority I am denylng your
visiting privileges effective immediately until the determination of your pending
criminal charges. At that point I will reconsider your visiting application.

Hardison, Warden
Idaho State Correctional Institution

Wjk
Cc: DW Christensen; Sgt. McIntire

LN THE DISTRLCT COURT OF THE FOURTH IUDIClAL
THE STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WILLLAM LIGHTNER and
MARCIA LIGHTNER,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CVOC-0720193

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.

JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REINKE,
and STEVE NELSON,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
la

I

Court heard oral arguments on Monday, December 22, 2008. The Plaintiffs appeared pro se, Mrs.

19

Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner telephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark

20

Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For
21

i

the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is granted.

In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an unknown charge. A@ Marcia

F/

r i

25

Lightner, Exhibit A. While serving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a

26

00007
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I

contract vendor at the c o m i s s q at the Idaho State Conectional Institute (ISGI). Civil Riglzts
1

Complaint,

2

11 27. fn

1997, the couple married and Willim Lightner remained incarcerated. Civil

Rights Cot~plaint,Ij 27. In 1998, Willim Lightner used the @evmce process in regard to visitation
issues. A$$ Jill Whitlington, P/ 13. The Li&tners objected to the prison policy that denied visitation

4

the couple. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, fj 29. Restricted visitation was granted and the

"lo

1

11

Lightners objected to the form of the visitation granted. First Antended Civil Rights Complaint.
29. In 2000 or 2001, the Lightners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complairtt, 11

I
I111

29. In 2005 William Lightner granted parole. Af John Hardison,

9

11 6; Exhibit D. While he was on

parole, the Lightners lefl the country and took up residence in Belize. A@ Marcia Lightner,

lo

11

7 6.

On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested for the felony offense of harboring a felon

7 5; A# Mark klubinski, Exhibit A. The

12

in violation of Idaho Code rj 18-205. Afl: Marcia Lightner,

l3

following day she was released on bail. '48 Marcia Lightner, 7 5. Early in the morning on April 12,

'I
15

I/

I

2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her
visitation was suspended as a result of her anest. A$ Marcia Lightner,

7 10. Subsequently, Marcia

16

Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circunstances of the event and pleading
17

for reinstatement of visitation. AfJ: Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A. Warden Blades reinstated the

18
19

Lightners' visitation on the condition that she keep the facility informed of the status of her case.

20

Afl:

21

Marcia Lightner,

I

7 18.

The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William

23

25

7 16. Marcia Lightner contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but

1 / failed to provide any other updates. A#

22

24

Marcia Lightner,

Lightner accepted a visitation restriction when offered the choice of visitation restriction or a DOR

II

for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia

000072

26
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11

DOR for inappropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22, 2007, other visitors to the ldaho State Correctional
hstitute complained that Marcia Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was
dressed inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing clothing and a lack of undergments.

Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Lightner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her
disabled identification permit. Id. M e n reminded to be sure that her permit was displayed, Marcia
Lightner exhibited hostility to the officer. Id.
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was informed by telephone that visitation was
suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration

lo

,,
12

l3

l4

pending the outcome of her case. A&? Marcia Liglxtner,

7 21. Although

requests for a personal

11 meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the I

1
1

visitation suspension. Afl Marcia Lightner

2.3. No internal jrievanees relating to visitation issues

were filed by Williml Lightner between January 2007 and January 2001. // bN Wittingion 1 13.

15

On March 31, 2008, Marcia Lightner pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two
16
17

l8

l9

I
1

year probation sentence. Af

Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A. The harboring a felon charge was dismissed

as part of the plea agreement. A . Marcia Lightner,

7

5. The Lightners have had visitation since

I1

June 13, 2008. '48 fohn Hardison, Exhibit H. To compensate for the period of separation, the

20

Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit-a

21

million. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 11.

23

total of nearly $1.5

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

24

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
25
26
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/I

reveals that no disputed issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. First Sec.

B a ~ kof Idaho, NA. v. Murpily, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). In a motion for

summary j u d g ~ e n t ,all disputed facts are constsued liberally in favor of the non-moving party and
all reasonable inferences drawn ftorn the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho
7

253, 255, 698 P.2d 3 15, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse
8

/I

party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,
21 1, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify.
Id., I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for sunlmary judgment, the non-moving party's case must
be anchored in soniething niore than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create
a genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volksrvagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
(1996).

WHETHER
PLAINTIFF
WILLIAM
LIGHTNER'S
CLAIMS
AREBARRED
Due TO HIS FAILURE
TO

I

EXHAUST
THE 1SCI GRIEVANCE
PROCESS
It is well established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of
confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code

22

11 U.S.C.5

23

19-4206; 42

1997e(a); Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 181 P.3d

524, 528 (2007). There is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance

24
25

I

procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison grievance system, having used it

000074
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in the past for similar issues. There is also sufficient evidence to ascepzain that not only did Mr.
Lightner fail to exhaust the administrative remedy process, he failed to avail himself of this process
of visitation.
at all with regard to the October s~~spension
Plaintiffs asserl that this is not a condition of confinement case, '"but only the ternination of
his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and
Objection to State" Motion for Summary Judment, 'lj 16. The Eighth h e n b e n t , which prohibits
cruel and musual punishents, imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). Conditions of confinenlent that are subject to exhaustion
have been defined broadly by federal courts as the effects of actions by g o v e m e n t officials on the
lives of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475, 499
(1973); Sinitk v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d
198, 200 (2d Cir.2002); 18 U.S.C. $ 3626(g)(2). The detemination of who may visit an inmate at
what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a govement officials that

I
I1

has an effect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of

17

confinemenr case to wkch the exhaustion requirement applies.

l8

ll

The Plaintiffs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but

20

these cases are very different from the one at hand. One cited case dealt with cell temperatures that

21

would cause inmates to become hypothennic. Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. lL.1997).

11
23

Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). Requiring inmates
to follow a grievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners'

24
25

00007
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5

1

l
3

situation was not life threatening. Plaintiff W i l l i a Lightner failed to exhaust the IDOC grievance

I1

process. Defendants' motion for s m a r y j u d p e n t with regard to this issue is granted.

WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS
RAVEFAILED
TO STATEA CLAIM
AGAINST
DIRECTORBRENTmlNKE
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there

4

/I

must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. Willinrrrs, 297

lo

l1
l2
l3

/llI

I

(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the
defendant)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't

/I
1

14

of SOC.Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the

section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a

civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must
be stated in the complaint with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged

15

constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any
16

factual allegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint.
17

l8

I!

Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue is granted.

WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS
HAVEFAILED
TO STATEA CLAIM
AGAINST
DEFENDANT
STEVENELSON

19

As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal

2o
21

11 participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances I

22

constituting that violation must be stated with paxticularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson

1

was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. AfJ: John
24

/IHardisorr, 7 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his I

/I
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I

/I
I1

personal participation in it would not be possible. Defendants' motion for summary judment with
regard to this issue is granted.

4

~ G H T S

5
6

The Unites States Constitution protects "certain kinds of highly personal relationships."

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 448 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States

7

Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationships where incarceration is a factor.
8

The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison
context.

9

10
11
12

Overto~zv. Buzzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citations omitted).
Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources-the

Due Process Clause itself and

I/
/I

the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting

l5

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does
not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . , for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a

l7

18

I111

19
20
21

22

Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well

II

within the terns of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thompson, 490 U.S.

I1

23

at 461 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468).
However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none

otherwise would have existed. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty

24

j5

liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v.

1

interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Thompson 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7

I

I11

I+ewitt, 459 U.S. at 472). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that liberty interests are

1
2

not created by negative implications from mlindatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an

4

atsical and significant deprivation from the normal incidenls of prison life. Id.Where the language

of state statutes and reelations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection. See
6

Mendozu v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation

7

contained explicit mandaroy lanmage that a visiting privilege could only be suspended after a
8

9

I

10

F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose nanles appear on the list
"shall" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection).

,,
l2

finding of guilt, the ternination of the privilege violated due process); T~ylorv. Armontrout, 894

1

Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604
should be interpreted as an expectation that visitation will be approved between any
person and my inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges.

Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each
division may develop standard operating procedures and field memoranda to govern
inmate visiting.

A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal
investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of
the facility head or designee.

I

Additionally, Rule 604 makes clear that visits may be suspended, restricted, or terminated at any
1
2

3
4

time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with stand&
operating procedures. IDAPA 06.01.01.404.06.
Plairltiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 604. The United States Suprerne Court
established a four factor test to determine the validity of a prison regulation affecting a

6

constitutional right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). ln 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court

7

applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visitation regulation. Overton v.
8

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid,
9

10

rational connection to a legitimate government interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to
inmates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an accommodation of the right would have on
guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the
regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not
on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. "The status of a person as a prisoner or a
non-prisoner does not determine whether the Turner test applies to prison regulations that may
affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2004);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting "any attempt to forge separate standards for
cases implicating the rights of outsiders").
Preventing an inmate from visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the
legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which
habitually create a disturbance serves the legitimate penological purpose of minimizing disruption
in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose
to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. Alternative means of

to mail services. These alternative methods of communication were fomd sufficient by the United

2

/IStates Supreme Court in Overtun. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' visits are
4

1

challalging for the guards, a drain on prison resources, and unfair to other inmates in that more time

"must
6

h e

n with the Li@bers to the deliinlent of other visitors. As to the impact an

accommodation for the Lightners would have on guards and i m a t e s and prison resources, even

7

when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that an attempt to
8

accommodate the Lightners could have been umeasonably time consuming and burdensome on the
9

l
,,

facility and the other inmates. In explanation of the fourth factor, the Unites States Supreme Court

12

prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted

lo

stated, "Turner does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the

11/I

right while not imposing more than a de minirnus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539

l3

l4

U.S. at 136. Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the

15

limited resources of the DOC.

16

The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be
17
18

l9
20
21

22

23

I

unconstitutional. The Court finds that Marcia Lightner's constitutional rights have not been violated

I(11

by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue
is granted.

WHETHER
DEFENDANT
~IARDISON
IS ENTITLED
TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The three-part inquiry to determine if a public official asserting qualified i m u n i t y is
entitled to the defense consists of: 1.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of

24

the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the
25
26
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1

/I

violation? and 3.) Was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Furnworth

I1

I

v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 869 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a reasonable official could have

3

believed that his actions were lawful, smmary j u d p e n t on the basis of qualified i m u n i t y is

4

appropriate. Mfiinsey v. Vernon, 130 Idaho 354, 357, 941 P.2d 327, 329 (1997) (quoting Hemptiill

/I1/
1

v. fincheloe, 987 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1993)). Only where there is a genuine issue of fact that

6

8

would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id.

I

Overton provides established law that visitation regulations which are rationally related to a
legitimate penological interest are constitutional. There is no Constitutional right to unrestricted

9

lo

12

11

I1

suspension of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
the c i r c ~ ~ s t a n c esurrounding
s
the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility.

l3

l4

visitation, therefore Defendant Wardison did not violate that right by imposing an indefinite

William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportunity to leave the facility.

11

Marcia Lightner was fooled by a fugitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were

I

objectively reasonable to ensure the security of the facility and minimize cost to the facility.
16

I/

Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment

17

II

with regard to this issue is granted.

18

19

WHETHER
MARCIAL I C H T N E CLAIM
R~
FOR ]LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
FAILSAS A MATTEROF LAW

2o

A claim for loss of consortium "is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a

21

third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Znc., 107 Idaho 389,

22

394,690 P.2d 324,329 (1984). "[Flederal courts have almost unanimously denied derivative loss of
consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights." Jeremiah v. Yanke Machine

24

Shop, Znc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998). In Jeremiah, the Idaho Supreme Court
25
26

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FORY-S

.JUDGMENT - Page 1 1

Oooo8

t

would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title VII or the Idaho

Human Rights Act. This case is similar. Mr. Lightner a s s e ~ sfederal and state law claims that his
il rights were inf~ngedbut neither Section 1983 nor the Habeas Corpus and Institutional

igation Procedures Act, ldafio Code

$4 19-4201 to 19-4236, recognizes

a loss of consortium

se of action. Even if Mr. Light-ner's claim were not barred by his failure to exhaust
dministrative remedies and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consortium claim based

pon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for summary
rnent with regard to this issue is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

-r

Dated this 2 2 day of January, 2009.

000082
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1, HEREBY CERTlFY that on th&L'L'day of January, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

DKNDANT'S

William. Lightner
1CC Unit-C PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

Marcia Lightner
300 E. 41 st Street
Garden City, ID 83724

Mark Kubinski
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 1 10
Boise, ID 83706

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Wand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

00 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ~ u . sMail,
. Postage Prepaid
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( ) Overnight Mail
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J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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Jt 41438 ICC W T - C

PO BOX 700 10
BOISE, D 83707

APPELLMTS, PRO, SE

IN TZE DISWCT COURT OF

FOURTH m I C N DISTNCT

OF THE S T A E OF DAIlO, IN AND FOR THE C O W Y OF ADA
W L L W L1
R
MARCIA LIGHTNER
Appellant's Pro, Se

1
1
)

Case No. rVr-OC-07-20193

NOmCE OF APPEAL

1

DOC DIWCTOR, BRENT RENK-Eet., al. )
JOEIN W I S O N ,
1
STEVE NELSON,
)
Respondent's
)

TO: THE ABOVE RESPOmEWS, ADA C O W Y 4" DISTRICT COURT et, al
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTMG OFFICE et., al, AND ADA C O W Y PUBLIC D E F W E R S
OFFICE et., d.AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, MARK KlJZ3INSK.I PROSECWWG
ATTORNEY'S AND T I E CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTlCE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT
1.

The above named Appellant William Lightner, and Marcia Lightner appeals against the

above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Memorandum opinion and order
dismissing the Appellants Civil Rights Complaint. (See attached M e m o m d m Opinion and

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1-

Order) entered in the above-entitled action (proceeding) on the 22 December 2008, Honorable
Ronald J. Wilper.

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or orders

described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule (I 1 (a),

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on apped which the appellw then intends to assert in

the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting
other issues an appeal.
A.

Marcia Lightners, loss of consoflim due process constitutional rights were violated

do to no hearing afforded her prior to visitation suspension.

B.

William Lightners, loss of consortium when wife's visitation was suspended

without due process hearing, the lack of a grievance process in place to grieve the warden
C.

The Lack o f a grievance process being in place to grieve the listed final appellate

authority

4.

D.

Lack of Due Process for a hearing, Double Jeopardy, and Retaliation.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript:

1.

Transcripts from hearing on 1 1- 14-2008

2.

Transcripts from hearing on 12-22-2008.

The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R.
Appellant has the Transcriwts;

G

The entire reporter's transcript supplemented by the following:

5.

LJ

Voir 13ire examination of jury

!J

Closing argments of counsel

i1

The following reporter" ppartid transcript:

ii

The Testimony of witnesses

i:

Conferences on requested ins&uctions

it

lmmctions verbally given by court

"Theappellant requests the following documents to be included I the clerk's record in

addition to those automatically in~ludedunder Rule 28, 1.A.R.
Appellant requests:
1.

1- 14-2008

Civil Rights Complaint

2.

6- 16-08

Amended Civil Rights Complaint

3.

11-2 1-2008

Memorandum for Summary Judgment

4.

1 1-2 1-2008

Afiidavit of Jill Whittington

5.

11-2 1-2008

Affidavit of Mark A. Kubibski

6.

11-2 1-2008

ANFidavit of John Wardison

7.

12-9-2008

Response and objection to States Motion for Summary
Judgment with Aadavits in support.
(2) Affidavits. (William and Marcia Lighmers Affidavits)

8.

12- 15-2008

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for

Summary Judgment.

6.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

That the derk of the district court or adminismive qency has been paid the

(b)( 1)

estimated fee for prepmtion of rcpaer's transcript.
(2) )f That the appsllant is exempt from paying the estimated trdnscript fee because
he is indigent and has already been granted indigence;
( c)(l j : 1

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk or agency's record has been

paid.

(2) :I That the appellant is exempt from. paying the estimated fee for the preparation
of the record because the affiant is indigent.

(d)(l) I !

That the appellate filing fite has been paid per the court's order of partial

payment;

2)

)k. That appellate is exempt &om paying the appellate filing fee because he is
indigent as shown by the court's order of partial payment of fees;

(e)

That service has been made upon all parities required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-140 1(1)' Idaho
Code.

Dated t h i s / L day of March, 2009

Dated this dday

of March, 2009

NOTICE OF APPEAL-4-
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STATE OF IDA130

)

>ss.
Counp of Ada
Willim Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the appellmt in the above-entitled NOTICE OF APPEAL and that all sbtements
in this Notice Of Appeal are true and correct b the best of his howledge and belief

5-29- 3 a y
Appellant Pro, Se

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /D@ day of

)

&

,2009

SEAL:
ommission expires:

.$--/C. --Ac'

/ c:

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Ada
(

/"

Marcia Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says:

That he is the appellant in the aboveentitled NOTICE OF &EAL

and that all syements

in this Notice Of Appeal are true and correct to the

-J-/desrno7

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day o

SEAL:
ommission expires:
NOTICE OF APPEAL-5-

5--/&

- A d /L>

000088

CERTIFICATE OF MAlLINC
1 I1EKEBY CERTIFY, That on the

day of March, 2009,I mailed a true and correct copy of

the NOTICE OF APPEAL via US mail system to:

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEML
APPELLATE UNIT
PO BOX, 83720.
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-00 10
M A W KUBlNSKl County Deputy

200 W FRONT STREET,
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-00 10

NOTICE OF A P P E A L 4

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH m I C I A L
THE STATE OF D M O , IN

WILLIAM LIGHTNER and
MARCIA LICHrnER,
Plaintiffs,

I

FOR THE ~

o OF AJ)A
~

y

Case No. CVOC-0720193
OFU3ER G U N T I N G DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

VS.
JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REINKE,
and STEVE NELSON,
Defendants.

16
17
Is

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The

I Coon heard oral arguments on Manday, December 22, 2008. The Plaintiffs appeared pro se, Mrs.

19
20

2L

Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner telephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark

II

Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For
the reasons stated below, Defendantsymotion is granted.

22

In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an unknown charge. A g izrlnrrio

I
000090

Ltgl~r~rt~t.,:
Frlrihrr A. Wl~ileserving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a
26

c,
I

I

I

ORDER GRANTIXCi IlEFENDANTS. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JIIDUMENT - Page I

II

contract vendor at the commissw at the Idaho State Correctional Institute (ISCI). Civil Rights

11
II1I

Compluint. 7 27. In 1997, the couple m ~ e and
d William Lightner remained incarcerated. Civil

Rights Conplaint, 127. In 1998, Willim Li@tner used the grievance process in regard to visitation
issues. A
H Jill Whittifigton,7 13. The Li&tners objected to the prison policy that denied visitation

to the couple. Firs! Amended Civil Rig&&Complaint, 7 29. Restricted visitation was granted and the

6

I
I
I

L~ghtnersobjected to the forrn of the visitation granted. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 'fl

7

29. In 2000 or 2001, the Liatners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 'fl

8

29. In 2005 William Lightner granted parole. Afl John Nardison, 7 6; M i b i t

L).

M i l e he was on

9

10

II

II
l2
l3

14

l11
11

parole, the Lightners left the country and took up residence in Belize. Afl Marcia Lightner, 'fl 6.
On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested for the felony of"fense of harboring a felon
in violation of Idaho Code $ 18-205. Afl Marcia Lightner, 'fl 5; AfJ: Mark hliibinski, Exhibit A . The
following day she was released on bail. Aff Marcia Lightner. 7 5. Early in the morning on April 12,

2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her

15

visitation was suspended as a result of her arrest. AH fircia Lightner, 'fl 10. Subsequently, Marcia

16
17

IS

II

Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circumstances of the event and pleading

I/

for reinstatement of visitation. Afl Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A. Warden Blades reinstated the

19

Lightners' visitation on the condition
that- she keep the facility
informed of the status of her case.
-- - -

20

A 8 Marcia Lightner, 'fl 16. Marcia Lightner contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but

21

22

1

failed to provide any other updates. rlfS Xkrrcia Ligkitler, 71 18.

The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William
.*

23
23

II

Lightner accepted a visitation restriction when offered the choice of visitation restriction or a DOR

-

.-.

for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia

-

25
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1

Lightner. Afl John Hardison, Exhibit G. On December 28, 2006, Willim Lightner was issued a

BOR for inappropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22,2007, other visitors to the Idaho State Conectional

-

-

Institute complained that Marcia Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was
dressed inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing clolhinl; and a lack of undergments.

_

Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Li&tner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her

_-_____

__----I_------

--

disabled identification pemit. Id. When r e ~ n d e dto be sure that her pemit was displayed, Marcia
C

.

L i & ~ e rexhibited hostility to the officer. Id.
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was infomed by telephone that visitation was

1
I1

suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration

pending the outcome of her case. A f l Marcia Lightner,

l2

11

3 21. Although requests for a personal

meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the

I

visitation suspension. A@ Marcia Lightner, 1 23. No internal grievances relating to visitation issues
were filed by William Lightner between January 2007 and January 2008. Aff:JiIl Nhittington, 11 13.
15

On March 3 1, 2008, Marcia Lightner pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two
16

I Iyear probation sentence. A f l Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A . The harboring a felon charge was dismissed I
as part of the plea agreement. A f l Marcia Liglttner, 15 . The Lightners have had visitation since
June 13, 2008. Afl John Hurclison, E-rhibif H. To compensate for the period of separation, the
Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit--a

total of nearly $1.5

million. First ilitletlcic~dCivil Rights Coirtplrint, i 1 .
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary j u d p e n t is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

000092
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that the moving party is entitled to a judmmt as a matter of law."' I.R.G.P. 561~).If the evidence
1

reveals that no disputed issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. Firsf Sex.
Bank uf Mulzo, N.A. v. Mirrphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). In a motion for

summary judwent, all disputed facts are consmed liberally in favor of the non-moving party and
all reasonable inferences drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the: non-moving party.
See Williams v. Blukley, 114 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Biake v. Cmz, 108 ldaho

253, 255, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Proeedwe 56(e) provides that a.n adverse
party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stufts, 125 Idaho 208,

10

11.

21 1, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set

12

forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testifjl.

l3

Id., I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's case must

14

be anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create

15

a genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
16

(1 996).
17

WHETHERPLAINTIFF
WILLIAM
LIGHTNER'S
CLAIMS
ARE BARRED
DUETO HIS FAILURE
TO

18

l9

j0

21
22

23

1

EXHAUST
THE ISCI GRIEVANCE
PROCESS

I/
II
1/

/

It is well established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of

confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code 9 19-4206; 42
I.S.C. 8 1997eta); Dretttlon v. Llnho State Correcrionnl Insfittrrion, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 181 P.3d

524, 528 (2007) There is suscient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance

21

procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison gievance system, having used it
25

00009
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I

I

11

Lightner fail to exhaust the administrative remedy process, he failed to avail himself of this process

I/
4

at ail with regard to the October suspension of visitation.

11

1

6

Plaintiffs assert that this is not a condition of confinement case, "but only the termination of

his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and
Objection to State" Motion for Summary Judgment, 3 16. The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits

7

cruel and unusual punisbents, imposes a duty on pfison officials to provide humane conditions of
8

confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. HeIIing v.
9

l
/I
I

McKinnq, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). Conditions of confinement that are subject to exhaustion

lo

have been defined broadly by federal courts as the effects of actions by government officials on the

l1

lives of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475, 499

l2

I11

(1973); Snzitlz v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d

l3

'*

198, 200 (2d Cir.2002); 18 U.S.C.

8 3626(g)(2). The determination of who may visit an inmate at

15

what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a government officials that
16

has an effect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of
17

confinement case to which the exhaustion requirement applies.
18
19

The PlaintifEs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but

20

these cases are very different from the one at hand. One cited case dealt with cell temperatures that

21

11

would wusc inmates to become hypothermic. hfitircltellv. Sltomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. IL. 1997).
Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). Requiring inmates

23

to foIlotv a grievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners'

24
25

26
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situation was not life threatening. PlaintiE Willim Lightner failed to exhaust the DOC grievance
process. Defendants' motion for summaryjudgment with regard to this issue is granted.

WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS
WAVE FAILED
TO STATE
A CLAIM
AGAINST
DIRE~O
BRENT
R REINKE
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there
must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. Williams, 297
F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring
personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations); May v. Enornoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the
defendm)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep'r
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the
section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a
civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must
be stated in the complaint with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Plaintiffis do not identifjl any alleged
constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any
factual allegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue is granted.

WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS
WAVE FAILED
TO STATE
A CLAIM
AGAINST
DEFENDANT
STEVE
NELSON
As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal
participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances
constituting that violation must be stated with particularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson
was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. A$

John

Ifrrrclisoir, 1; 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his

II
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I/
I
/I

personal pa~ticipationin it would not be possible. Defendants' motion for s m a r y judment with
regard to this issue is granted.

WHETHER
THE DENIAL
OF MARCIA
LICHTNER'S
VISITATION
VBOLATE
HERCONSTITUT!ONAL

11

1

The Unites States Constitution protwts "certain kinds of highly personal relationships."
Robertr v. United State iuycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States

7

Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationsbps where incarceration is a factor.
8

The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison
context.

9

10
11

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citations omitted).
Protected liberty interests "may arise from hvo sources--the

Due Process Clause itself and

I1

the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections Y. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting

l5

l6
l7

11

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "'The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does

I1

not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . , for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a
liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v.

19

Rutherford 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well

20

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thonzpson, 490 U.S.
21

II
I1
I1

at 46 1 (quoting Newitt. 459 U.S. at 468).

22

23

However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none

otherwise would have existed. Tlzotttpsotz, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty

2i
25

interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Thornpson 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting

000096
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I

1

I
11

He~pitt,459 U . S . at 472). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that liberty interests are
not created by negative implications from mandatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v.

3

Conner, 5 15 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an

4

atypical and significmt deprivation from the normal incidents of prison life. Id. W e r e the lanpage
of state statutes and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due proeess protection. See

6

Mendmu v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation

7

contained explicit mandatory language that a visiting privilege could only be suspended after a
finding of guilt, the termination of the privilege violated due proeess); Tuylor v. Armontrout, 894
9

F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose names appear on the list

,, II"shall" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection).
Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604
should be interpreted as an expectation that visitation will be approved between any
person and any inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges.

Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each
division may develop standard operating procedures and field memoranda to govern
inmate visiting.

A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal
investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of
the facility head or designee.

I
I

Additionally, Rule 604 makes clear that visits may be suspended, restricted, or terminated at any
time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with standard
operating procedures. IRAPA 06.01.01.604.06.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 604. The United States Supreme Court
established a four factor test to detemine the validity of a prison regulation affecting a
constitutionai right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court
applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visitation regulation. Overtan v.

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid,
rational connection to a legitimate govement interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to
imates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an accommodation of the right would have on
guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the
regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not
on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. "The status of a person as a prisoner or a
non-prisoner does not detemine whether the Turner test applies to prison regulations that may
affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2004);
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting ' b y attempt to forge separate standards for
I

cases implicating the rights of outsiders").
Preventing an inmate from visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the
legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which
habitually create a disturbance serves the legitimate penological purpose of minimizing disruption

in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose
to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. Alternative means of

00009
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i

cornmunicatiot~are available to the Lightners, they have regular telephone conversations and access
to mail services. These alternative methods of comunication were foutd sufficient by the United
States Supreme Court in Overton. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' vislts are
challenging for the guards, a drain on prison resources, and unfair to other inmates in that more time
must be spent with the Li@hem to the detriment of other visitors. As to the impact an
accomn~odationfor the Lightners would have on guards and inmates and prison resources, even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that an attempt to
accommodate the Lightners could have been unreasonably time consuming and burdensome on the
facility and the other inmates. In explanation of the fourth factor, the Unites States Supreme Court
stated, '"Turner does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the
prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted
right while not imposing more than a de minimus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539

U.S. at 135. Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the
limited resources of the DOC.
The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be
unconstitutional. The Court finds that Marcia Lightner's constitutional rights have not been violated
by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue
is granted.
WHETHER
D E F E N D ~ WARDISON
NT
IS ENTITLED
TO QUALIFIED I % I ~ ~ U K I T Y

The three-part inquiry to determine if a public official asserting qualified immunity is
entitled to the defense consists of: I.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of

the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the

1I
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11II v. Fenzling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 869 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a reasonable official could have
violation? and 3.) Was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Farnworth

2

believed that his actions were lawful, su

ary judment on the basis of qualified immunity is

I111
11

appropriate. Mck'irlsq v. Vernon, 139 Idaho 354,357,941 P.2d 327,329 (1997) (quoting Hemphill
v. Kineheloc, 087 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1993)). Only where there is a genuine issue of fact that

would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id.

7

Overton provides established law that visitation regulations which are rationally related to a
8
9

I

legitimate penologcal interest are constitutional. There is no Constitutional right to unrestricted

II
,,

visitation, therefore Defendanl Hardison did not violate that right by imposing an indefinite

12

the circumstances surrounding the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility.

l3

William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportunity to leave the facility.

14

Marcia Lightner was fooled by a fugitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were

lo

suspension of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

15

objectively reasonable to ensure the security of the facility and minimize cost to the facility.
16

Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment
17

with regard to this issue is granted.
18

19
2o
21

22

23

WHETHER
MARCIA
LIGHTNER'S
CLAIM
FOR LOSSOF CONSORTIUM
FAILSAS A MATTEROF LAW

A claim for loss of consortium "is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a
third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runeurn

I.

Slzectrer Lumber Protizicts, Irtc., 107 Idaho 389,

(1 394,690 P.?d 324,329 (1984). "[Fledera1 courts have almost unanimously denied derivative loss of
consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights.'Veretniuh v. Yunke Muchitle

14

S/tc>p,IIIC.,131 Idaho 232, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998). In Jere~niuh,the Idaho Supreme Court

26
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000100

would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title V I or the Idaho
1

I/ Human Rights Act. This case is similar. Mr. Lightner asserts federal and state law claims that his
Ilcivil rights were infringed bet neither Section 1983 nor the Habe= Corpus and Institutional
4

Litigation Procedures Act, Idaho Code

44 19-4201 to 19-4226, recognizes a loss of consortium

' Ilcause of action. Even if Mr. Lightner's claim were not barred by his failure to exhaust
' administrative remedies and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consortium claim based

/I

upon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for sumnlary

11judgment with regard to this issue is granted.
-t"

Dated this 2
4' day of January, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
?
'
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I, HEWBY CERTIFY that on thMzday
of January, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT" MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

William Lightner
ICG Unit-C PO Box 700 10
Boise, ID 83707

& U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

M m i a Lightner
300 E. 41st Street
Garden City, ID 837 14

(9U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Mark Kubinski
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 110
Boise, ID 83706

(\j U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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W ZLLIAM LIGI-fWER

s, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk

# 41438 ICC UNIT-C

By A, LYKE

PO BOX 700 10
BOISE. ID 83707

DEWW

MARCIA LICHTNER
300 E 41''
GARDEN CITY, ID 837 14
APPELLANTS, PRO, SE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WILLIAM LICHTMER
MARCIA 1,IGHTNER
Appellant's Pro, Se

)

STEVE NELSON,
Respondent's

1
1

Case No. CV-OC-07-20193

1

)
)
IDOC DIRECTOR, BRENT RENKE et., al. )
JOHN HARDISON.
)

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE RESPONDENTS, ADA COUNTY 4r" DISTRICT COURT et, a1
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING OFFICE et., al, AND ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS
OFFICE et., al. AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, MARK KUBINSKI PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY'S, THE CLERK AND REPORTER OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant William Lightner, and Marcia Lightner appeals against the

above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Memorandum opinion and order
dismissing the Appellants Civil Rights Complaint. (See attached Memorandum Opinion and Order

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-I-

in the first Notice of Appeal) entered in the above-entitled action (proceeding) on the 22 December

2008, Honorable Ronald J. Wilper.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or orders

described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and p u r s m t to Rule (1 1(a),

3.

A preliminw statement of the issues on appeal which the appellmt then intends to assert in

the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting
other issues on appeal.
A.

Marcia Lightners, due process constitutional rights were violated do to not hearing

afforded her prior to visitation suspension.
B.

William Lightners, loss of consortium when wife's visitation was suspended

without due process.
4.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the

reporter's transcript:
I.

Transcripts from hearing on 11- 14-2008

.3

Transcripts from hearing on 12-22-2008.

The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R.
Appellant has the Transcripts;

TI

The entire reporter's transcript supplemented by the following:

2

Voir Dire examination of jury

il

Closing arguments of counsel

O

The following reporter's partial transcript:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-2-

J
5.

From all Heaings held during this case:

i!

The Testimony of wihesses

Ci

Conferences on requested insmctions

i1

Instmctions verbally given by court

The appellant requests the following documents to be included I the clerk's record in

addition to those aulornatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
Appellmt requests:
1.

1-14-2008

Civil Rights Complaint

2.

6- 16-08

Amended Civil Rights Complaint

3.

11-2 1-2008

Memorandum for Summary Judgment

4.

1 1-21-2008

Affidavit of Jill Wittington

5.

1 1-21-2008

Affidavit of Mark A. Kubinski

6.

11-2 1-2008

AMidavit of John Hardison

7.

12-9-2008

Response and objection to States Motion for Summary
Judgment with Affidavits in support.

(2) Affidavits. (William and Marcia Lightners Affidavits)
8.

12-15-2008

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for
S w a r y Judgment.

6.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter.

(b)(l) U That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of reporter's transcript.
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(2)

1/ That the appellant is exempt tiom paying the estimated transcript fee because
he is indigent and has already been grmted indigence;

( c)(l) ,i That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk or agency's record has been

paid.
(2)

J

That the appellanl; is exempt from paying the estimated f"ee for the preparation

of the record because the affiant is indigent.
(d)(l)

2)

, A

That the appellate filing fee has been paid per the court's order of partial

p7;

That appellate is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he is

indigent as s h o w by the court's order of partial payment of fees;
(e)

That service has been made upon all parities required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-140 1(1), Idaho
Code.

Dated this J M a y of March, 2009

APPELLANT PRO, SE

Dated t h i 6 d a y of March, 2009
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/

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Ada
(
William Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the appellant in the above-entitled AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL and that all
statements in this Amended Notice Of Appeal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief.

Appellant Pro, Se
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

SEAL:

day of

k(a~,-

,2009

HERBERT J. WILS
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Commission expires:

r3--/ L

-27/, 0

STATE OF IDAHO )
>ss.
County of Ada
Marcia Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says:
'That he is the appellant in the above-entitled AMENDED N
statements in this Amended Notice Of Appeal are true an
belief.

f

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,&'kLc. day of

OF APPEAL and that all
o the be$ of his knowledge and
r"

+
- "4

/ / L C

,2009

SEAL:

$ Commission expires:
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IN THE DLSmCT COURT OF THE FOmm JUDIC

TJ3E STAIE OP D M O , IN

WmW LIGHTNER and
MARCLA L I G H m R ,
Plaintiffs,

FOR TEE C O m OF ADA

Case No. CVOC:O720 t 93
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT
VS.
JOHN HARDISON, BRENT RE=,
and STEVE NELSON,
Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The

Court heard oral mgunents on Monday, December 22, 2008. The Plainti% appeared pro se, Mrs.
Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner teiephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark

Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For

I

the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is granted.

BACKGROUND
In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an u h o w n charge, Af

Marciu

Ligl~tnur,Eshihit A. While serving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a
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I

contract vendor at the comissary at the Idaho State Correctional hstibte (ISCI). Civil Rights
Complaint, fl 27. In 1997, the couple married md William Lightner mmained incareer&ed. Civil
Rights Compfaint, fl27. In 1998, William Li&tner used the grievance process in regard to visitation
issue. A
H Jill mittinaon, fi 13. The Ligh~nersobjected to the prison policy that denid visitation
to the couple. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, ( 29. Restricted visitation was granted and the
Lightners objected to the form of the visitation granted. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 7
29. In 2000 or 2001, the Lightners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, fl

II

29. In 2005 Willim Lightna granted parole. A$ John Hardifon, TI 6; Exhibit L). While he was on

I

parole, the Lightners left the country and took up residence in Belize. Af Marcia Lightner, fl 6.

11

On April 10,2007, Marcia Lightna was arrested for the felony offense of harboring a felon
in violation of Idaho Code 9 18-205. Af Morcia Lightner, fi 5; Af Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A. The

following day she was released on bail. A$ Mmcia Lightner, 7 5. Early in the morning on April 12.

II(

2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her
visitation was suspended as a result of her arrest. A$ Marcia Lightner, ( 10. Subsequently, Marcia
Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circumstances of the event and pleading
for reinstatement of visitation. A$

Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A. Warden Blades reinstated the

I11

Lightners' visitation on the -condition that
- -she keep the facility
-- informed of the status of her case.

AN Marcia Lighfner, 116. Marcia Lightnqr contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but
failed to provide any other updates. A 8 iMurcicl Lightner, 18.

I

.

The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William

I
I/

Lightner accepted a visitation restriction when offered the choice of visitation restriction or a DOR

-

for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia

II

.
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1

II

Lightner. A 8 John Wardison, Exhibit C. On Dmember 28, 2006, William Lightner was issued a

II
II

I

DOR for imppropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22,2007, other visitors to the Idaho State Corntiondl

--

hstitute complained that M m i a Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was
inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing c l o ~ n and
g a lack of undergments.

Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Lightner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her

- - ---

.w.

---

disabled identification permit. Zd. W e n reminded to be sure that her permit was displayed, Marcia
r

.

Lightner exhibited hostility to the officer. Id.
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was Sormed by telephone that visitation was

suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration

I/

pending the outcome of her case.

I

A@"

Marcia Ligktner,

7 21. Although requests for a personal

meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the

14

visitation suspension. AffrMarcia Lightner, 7 23. No internal grievances relating to visitation issues

11 were filed by William Lightner between January 2007 and January 2008. A$

15

Jill liNittingon, 7 13.

I

I1

On March 31, 2008, Marcia Lightna pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two

16

year probation sentence. AH Mark fibinski, Exhibit A. The harboring a felon charge was dismissed
as part of the plea agreement. A$

Marcia Lightner, 1 3. The Lightners have had visitation since

June 13, 2008. A f l John tiardison, Exhibit ti. To compensate for the period of separation, the
Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit-a

total of nearly $1.5

/I

million. Firsr Anzended Civif Rights Compluint, 1I .

I
I

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
24

11 together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and I

that the moving party is entitled to a judpent as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). If the evidence
reveals that no disputed issues of material f x t exist, then only a question of law remains. First Sec.
3

Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). In a motion for

4

smmary judment, all disputed facts ase construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party and
all reasonable inferences drawn h m the record are to be &awn in favor of the non-moving party.
See Williams v. BIakley, I I 4 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Blake v. C m ,108 Idaho

253,255, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse
party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits
specific fats showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,
2 11,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set
for~hfacts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the amant is competent to testify.
Id., 1.RC.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must
be anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create

a genuine issue. Zirnmeman v. Volkrwugon ofdrnerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854,920 P.2d 67, 69
( 1996).
WHETHERPLAINTIFF WILLIAM LICHTNER'S
CLA~MS
AREBARRED
DUETO HIS FAILURE
TO
EXHAUST
THE lSCI GRIEVANCE
PROCESS

It is we11 established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of
21

confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code $ 19-4206; 42

U.S.C. 5 1997e(a); Drennon v. Iiluho Slate Correciional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 18 1 P.3d
524, 528 (2007). There is sufticient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance
23

procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison grievance system, having used it
25

Ooo114

26
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in the pmt for similar ~ssu€%.
There is a 1 sumcimt
~
evidence to ascertain &at not only did Mr.
Lightner fail to exhaust the adminishative remedy pmcess, he failed to avail himself of this pmcess
at all with regard to the October s
Plaintifls assert that this is not a condition of confinement ease, "but only the termination of
his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and
Objation to State's Motion for S u m q Judgment, 7 16. The Eighth Amendmenf, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments, imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of
confinement and to take reasonable measures to

tee the safety of the h a w . HeIIing v.

McKinney. 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). Conditions of c o n h m e n t that are subject to exhaustion
ave been defined broadly by federal c o w as the effects of actions by government officials on the
ves of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. 475, 499
973); Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446,449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Gourd, 304 F.3d
198, 200 (2d Cir.2002); 18 U.S.C. 4 3626(g)(2). The detehnation of who may visit an inmate at
what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a government oficials that

has an efflect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of
confinement case to which the exhaustion requirement applies.
The Plaintiffs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but
ese cases are very different from the one at hand. One cited case dealt with cell temperatures that
uld cause inmates to become hypothennic. Mitcfteflx Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. IL. 1997).
Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). ~equiringinmates
to follow a gievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners'
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situation was not life Wtening. Plaintiff William Lightnet failed to exhaust the DOC lgievance
1

process. Defendants' motion for s u m a r y judgment with regard to this issue is panted.

2

WHETHER
PLAINTIFFS
HAVEFAILED
TO STATE
A CLAIM
AGAINST
DIRE~O
BRENT
R
NU
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there

4

mu& be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. William, 297
6

F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Thylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring

7

personal pdcipation in the alleged constitutional violations); May v. Eitomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
8

(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the
9

lo

l1

11

defendmt)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't

I/
I/II

of Sbc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the

section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a

l2

13

"

civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must

/I

be stated in the complaint with particularity. 1.R.C.P. P(b) Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged

15

constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any
16

fa~tualallegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint.
17

I

Defendants' motion for summaryjudgment with regard to this issue is granted.

18

20
21
22
23
24

I/
11

As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal

participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances
constituting that violation must be stated with particularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson
was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. A f l John

Hcir~liso~z,
7 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his

25

II
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I

II

personal paicipation in it would not be possible. D e f m h t s ' motion for s m w judment with

regard to this issue is &;ranted.

2

WHETHER
THE DENIAL
OF MARCIA
LIGHTNER'SIS IT AT ION VIOLATEHERCONSTITUTIONAL

3

11

The Unites States Constitution protects "certain kinds of highly personal relationships.'"
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States

II Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationships where incarceration is a factor.
The very object of bprisommt is confinement. Many of the liberties and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistat with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison
context.

II
11
II
1II

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 13 1 (2003) (citations omitted).
Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sow-the

Due Process Clause itself and

the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting

I5

Iiewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does

l6
17

not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . ,for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a

18

liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v.

11

Rutherford. 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well

20

21
22

23

1)

within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thompson, 490 U.S.
at 46 1 (yuotitlg Hetvirt, 459 U.S. at 468).

I1
1

However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none

othewise would have existed. Tkotpson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty

24

25

1

interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Tjtotnpson 490 U.S. at 4 m @ f t P q

2

not created by negative impficaGons from mandatory language in prison rewlations. Sandin v.

Conner, 5 15 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an
4

atypical and sill;nificmt deprivation from the norrnal incidents of prison life. Id. Where the language
of state statutes and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection. See

6

a n d o m v. Blodgen, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation
conr;sinexf explicit mmdatoy language that a visiting privilege could only be suspended after a
finding of guilt, the ternination of the privilege violated due process); Taylor v. Armontrout, 894

9

10

II F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose names appear on the list I

,,
l2

I

"shall'" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection).

1

Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part:
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604
should be interpreted as an expectation Wit visitation will be approved between any
person and any inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges.

Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each
division may develop standard operating procedures and field memoranda to govern
inmate visiting.

20

A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal
21

investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of
the facility head or designee.

22
23

IDAPA 06.01.01.604.01, .02, .05(j).

24
25

000115
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Additionally, Rule 604 m&m clear that visits may be s u s p d d mhcted, or teminatd at any
1

/I
11
/I11

time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with standard
operating procedm. IDAPA 06.01 .01.604.06.
Plaintigs challenge the comljb~onalityof Rule 604. The United States Suprme Court

established a four factor test to d

6

ne the validty of a prison regulaljon agmting a

constitutional right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court

7

applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visihtion replation. Overton v.
8

Bazzettu, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid,
9

rational comation to a legitimate g o v e m m t interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to

10

,,

inrnates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an a c c o m d i o n of the right would have on

12

guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the

13

regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not

11 on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. 'The status of a person as a prisoner or a I
15

non-prisoner does not determine whether the Turner test applies to prison regulations that may

16

affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 68 1 (8th Cir. 2004);
17

T h o n b u ~ hv. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting "any attempt to forge separate standards for

18
19

cases implicating the rights of outsiders").
Preventing an inmate h m visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the

21

legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which

22

habitually create a distulance serves the legitimate penological purpose of minimizing disruption

23

in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose

24

to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. Alternative means of
25

/I
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'

cornmication are available to the Li&tners, they have regular telephone conversations and access
to mail services. T h a e aiternative m e t h h of comunication were found suEcient by the United
States Supreme Court in Overson. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' visits are
challenging for the

S,

a

on prison resowces, and unfb to other inmates in that more time

must be spent with the Li&bers to the detriment of other visitors. As to the impact an
a c c o m d t i o n for the Lightners would have on guards and inmates and prison resources, even
when viewed in the light most f a v o d l e to the P l ~ t i f f s the
, evidence shows that an attempt to
accomodate the Lightners could have been w-nably

time consuming and burdensome on the

facility and the other inmates. In explanation of the fourth factor, the Unites States Supreme Court

stated, "'Ticmer does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the
prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted
right while not h p s i n g more than a de minimus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539

U.S. at 136, Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the
limited resources of the IDOC.
The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be
unconstitutional. The Court finds that Marcia Lightner's constitutional rights have not been violated
by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue
is granted.

WHETHER
DEFENDANT
HARDISON
IS ENTITLED
TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The three-part inquiry to determine if a public officiaI asserting qualified immunity is
entitled to the defense consists of: I.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of

the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the

1/
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I

v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 859 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a

2

believed that his actions were lawful, s
4

I/

6

m

nable official could have

q judwent on the basis of qualified i m m ~ l yis

appropriate, NcKimey v, Vernon, 130 I M o 354,357,941 P.2d 327,329 (1997) (quoting Nernphill
v. Kinchioe. 987 P.2d 189, 593 (9th Cir. 199))). Only where there is a genuine issue of fsst that

would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id.

7

Overton provides established law that visitation mgulations which are rationally related to a
8

legitimate penological interest are comtitutional. There is no Constitutional right to unrestricted
9

11
,,

visitation, therefore Defendant Hardison did not violate that right by imposing an indefinite

12

the c i r c m m c e s surrounding the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility.

13

William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportuity to leave the facility.

14

Marcia Li@ber was fooled by a fbgitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were

lo

s w m i o n of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,

15

objectively reasonable to ensure the security of the facility and minimize cost to the facility.

16

Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified imunity. Defendants'motion for s m q judgment
17

with regard to this issue is granted.
18

19

II

WHETHER
MARCIALIGHTNER'S
CLAIM
FOR LOSSOF CONSORTIUM
FAILSAS A ~ ~ A T I 'OF
E RLAW

2o

A claim for loss of consortium "'is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a

21

third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runcorn v. Sheurer Lumber Prodtccfs, Inc., 107 Idaho 389,

22

394,690 P.2d 324, 329 (1984). "[F]deral courts have almost unanimously denied derivative loss of

23

consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights." Jeremiah v. Yunke Machine

24

Shop, lnc., 131 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998). In Jeremiah, the Idaho Supreme Court
25
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would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title VII or the Idaho
Human Ri&t.s Act. This case is similar. Mr. Li&tner asserts federal and state law claims that his
civil rights were inFringed but neither Section 1983 nor the Habeas Corpus and Institutional

Litigation Procedures Act, Idaho Code $$ 19-4201 to 19-4226, recognizes a loss of consortium
cause of action. Even if Mr. Lightner's claim were not bared by his failure to exhaust
administrative r m d e s and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consorlium claim based
upon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for summary

judpent with regard to this issue is mted.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on th&xday of January, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
William Lighbrer
ICC Unit-C PO Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

U.S. hdail, Postage Prepajd
Wand Delivered
( ) Overni&t Mail
( ) Facsimile

Marcia Lightner
300 E. 41st Street
Garden City, ID 83714

ail, Postage Prepaid
::Gelived
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Mark Kubinski
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 110
Boise, ID 83706

()$ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

7
8

l1
12

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho
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CERTlFlGATE OF MAlLING
1 HEREBY CERTIFY, That on the

&day of Mach, 2009,I mailed a true and correct copy of

the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL via US mail system to:
MARK KUBINSKI
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEWL
PO BOX, 83720,
ROLSE, IDAHO 83720-0010
ADA COUNTY COURT WPORTER
200 W FRONT STWET,
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-0010

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-6-

LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F O m T H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Supreme COW Case No. 36259
Plaintiffs- Appellants,

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIIBITS

JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REDJKE and
STEVE WLSON,

I, 3. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Surnmary Judgment, filed
November 2 1,2008.
2. Affidavit of Jill Urhittington, filed November 21,2008.
3. Affidavit of Mark A. Kubinski, filed November 2 1,2008.
4. Affidavit of John Hardison, filed November 21,2008.
5. Affidavit of William Lightner, filed December 9,2008.
6. Affidavit of Marcia Lightner, filed December 9,2008.
7. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
December 15,2008.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court thls 22ndday of May, 2009.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
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"CERTIFICATE

OF EXHIBITS

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
)

ORDER GMNTING MOTION TO

)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 36259-2009
Ada County Docket No. 2007-20 193

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JOHN ILAmISON, BRENT KENKJE,
STEVE NELSON,
Defendants-Respondenls.
APPELLANTS MOTION TO AUCMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL WITH
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AUCMENT THE
RECORD were filed by Appellants on July 27,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below,
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXISIBITS:
1. Motion to Amend Civil Rights Complaint, file-stamped April 2 1, 2008;
2. Notice of Filing Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike
William Lightner's Affidavit w/ attachments, file-stamped December 19,2008;
3. Amended Affidavit in Support of Amended Complaint w/ attachment, file-stamped
April 23,2008;
4. Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, file-stamped February 12,2009;
5. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration w/ attachments, file-stamped
February 12,2009;
6. Affidavit of Marcia Lightner in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; file-stamped
February 12,2009; and
7. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped March 13,2009.

cc: Counsel of Record
William and Marcia Lightner, pro se
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XN THE DISTNCT C O m T OF THE F0mTf-T m I C L A L DZSTEUGTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Supreme Court Case No. 36259
Plaintiffs- Appellants,

CERTFICATE OF SERVICE

B E N T R E m and

JOHN W-ISON,

STEVE mLSON,

I, J, DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERKS WCORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCWT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
WLLIAM LIGHTNER

PAUL R. PANTHER

APPELLANT PRO SE

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
$1

.

Date of Service:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE: DISTRICT C O m T OF THE FOURTH m I C W DISTMCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUMTY OF ADA

Supreme Court Case No. 36259
Plaintiffs- Appella~ts,

CERTFICATE TO W C O m

STEVE MLSON,

I, J. DAVID NAV

0 , Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the

State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the

11" day of March, 2009.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District C o w

CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

